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CONFLICT OF LAWS STRUCTURE AND VISION: 
UPDATING A VENERABLE DISCIPLINE 
LAURA E. LITTLE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Conflict of Laws presents opportunities for meaningful reflection 
on legal regulation and governmental structure. But that’s just the 
beginning. In the course of resolving conflicts issues, legal thinkers 
can develop a deep understanding of the nature of law itself. While 
traditional conflicts thinking and pedagogy may have at one time 
fulfilled this promise, it now fails. As a result, many perceive the 
field as arcane, dry, and possibly even irrelevant.1 Conflict of Laws is 
none of these things. To begin with, Conflict of Laws doctrines 
control some of the most compelling issues of our time: same-sex 
marriage,2 internet regulation,3 and mass tort litigation,4 to name just 
a few. Equally important, Conflict of Laws presents a vehicle for 
studying issues related to globalism, world governance, and the 
changing nature of law practice.5 After all, if a legal problem is 
answered with clashing regulations from different jurisdictions, this 
                                                                                                                 
 * Copyright 2014 by Laura E. Little, Charles Klein Professor of Law and Government, Temple 
University’s Beasley School of Law, Associate Reporter, Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws. I am 
grateful for the able research assistance of Katherine Burke, Danielle Pinol, and Bradley Smith. This 
piece was presented at a faculty seminar at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, organized by 
Professor Elsabe Schoeman. The views represented in this article are solely those of the author and do 
not represent the views of the American Law Institute. 
 1. E.g., Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 47 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 63, 66 (2014): “The technical, arcane, legal techniques known in the civil law world 
as Private International Law or, in the common-law world as the Conflict of Laws (“Conflicts”) . . . .” 
 2. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public 
Policy Exception, 106 Yale L.J. 1965 (1997). 
 3. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199, 1212–13 (1998) 
(discussing the feasibility of national regulation of cyberspace, conflict of laws, and other “tools 
available to resolve multijurisdictional cyberspace conflicts.”); Laura E. Little, Internet Choice of Law 
Governance, China Private Int’l Law F. (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045070 (arguing 
that internet governance issues require heightened attention and consideration of specialized rules). 
 4. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 547, 551 
(1996) (discussing choice of law concepts in complex litigation). 
 5. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Conflict of Laws, Globalization, and Cosmopolitan Pluralism, 51 
Wayne L. Rev. 1105 (2005). 
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is a sign that the problem is important and difficult. The existing texts 
in the field, including scholarly articles, casebooks, treatises, and 
other monographs, tend to fall short in using Conflict of Laws to 
highlight its importance and explore its contemporary contexts. The 
discipline needs reinvigorating. 
This is a message important to all legal thinkers who might 
encounter Conflict of Laws: legislators, judges, legal scholars, law 
professors, practitioners, and law students. This essay highlights 
some remarkable insights that Conflict of Laws issues provide to this 
wide audience. The essay provides raw material for scholars and 
practicing lawyers, who stand to benefit from these issues and have 
the ability to raise the consciousness of others about their 
contemporary importance. Riding on the hope of the next generation, 
this essay also focuses on pedagogy with ideas on how to highlight 
the issues in courses on Conflict of Laws, International Civil 
Litigation, and other procedural courses.6 
Why does the study of Conflict of Laws hold such promise in 
penetrating the essence of legal regulation and governmental 
structure? Choice of law issues present profound clashes among the 
rules that regulate human life. To choose which of those rules should 
actually exert control, legal thinkers must identify first-order 
principles that inform the rules’ content and empower rules to 
regulate human affairs. Whether society likes it or not, humans 
possess egos and relish power, even if it is only the power to control 
self-destiny. Inescapable power struggles and the challenges of 
compromise are put in sharp focus when framed in legal rules. One 
might imagine that a legal shroud might sober the power struggles, 
reducing the emotional distraction and confusion. Whether or not this 
calming effect occurs when lawyers and judges resolve Conflict of 
Laws questions in legal practice and litigation, the emotional and 
                                                                                                                 
 6. In this way, this essay expands on and updates valuable literature from the 1990s. In 1996, the 
Toledo Law Review ran a symposium on teaching Conflict of Laws. See generally Symposium, Conflict 
of Laws, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 577 (1996). Other articles on conflicts pedagogy have sporadically 
appeared. See generally William L. Reynolds, Why Teach International Family Law in Conflicts?, 28 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 411 (1995); Gene R. Shreve, 1992 Survey of Books Relating to the Law; VII. 
Choices of Law and Remedy: Teaching Conflicts, Improving the Odds, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1672 (1992) 
(reviewing DAVID H. VERNON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (1990)). 
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psychological underbelly of Conflicts provides an important 
opportunity for understanding power struggles. More importantly, for 
the purposes here, emotional and psychological angles bring rules 
alive and thus provide a key teaching vehicle. By highlighting the 
“human side” of Conflicts, the Conflict of Laws scholar, teacher, and 
practitioner can provide her audience with an important and 
interesting angle. 
Simply presenting Conflict of Laws’ jurisprudential questions in 
abstract form can overlook this human side of the discipline and fail 
to engage the audience. Plain words about the emotional, 
contemporary, and practical implications of Conflicts doctrine can 
help hook the listener. Yet the profound, abstract questions that 
comprise Conflicts of Laws are what the discipline make so 
important. The challenge then is to navigate a balance between the 
two angles, seeking to capture both the practical and theoretical 
richness in the subject matter. 
For teaching, most existing casebooks squander the promise of 
Conflicts as a tool for broad understanding.7 This loss derives from a 
number of different mistakes. Many texts rely heavily on older cases 
that fail to captivate the modern imagination. Others miss thematic 
threads binding the discipline, either because the texts embrace an 
encyclopedic presentation or trace the development of Conflicts 
through long lines of cases. Finally, texts lose students’ interest and 
understanding when the students perceive the textual discussion as 
entangled in a maze of abstract analysis or as pursuing an elusive, 
“hide the ball” approach with the material. The plodding, 
evolutionary approach of many presentations of Conflict of Laws, 
such as when many texts trace a long line of cases, can exacerbate 
this perception. The result can be low enrollments and low student 
interest. While distressing for the purposes of legal knowledge and 
global understanding, this is also problematic for another basic 
reason: the subject is on the bar examination in twenty-six states and 
                                                                                                                 
 7. I note that I have a dog in this hunt: LAURA E. LITTLE, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, PROBLEMS, 
AND MATERIALS (2013). Indeed, this essay springs from thoughts I developed during the several years—
steeped in conflicts material—I wrote that book. 
3
: Conflict of Laws Structure and Vision: Updating a Venerable Disci
Published by Reading Room, 2015
234 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2 
the District of Columbia.8 Most importantly, uninspired pedagogy 
makes creative legal advocacy and cutting-edge scholarship less 
likely. If future lawyers and academics do not experience the promise 
of Conflict of Laws analysis during their formative stages, they are 
less likely to push the discipline in new directions that accommodate 
changes in the legal, social, and technological landscapes. 
Conflict of Laws pedagogy and scholarship benefit from 
emphasizing current problems, highlighting themes that integrate the 
subject matter (and tether it to current challenges), identifying 
specific topics that expose the subject’s relevance, and exploring 
lawyering skills easily integrated with Conflicts. The subject 
naturally presents opportunities to present cutting-edge issues of 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Alabama Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/njnjz/al.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2014); Arkansas Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., 
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/fjywq/ar.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Colorado Subjects Listed, 
U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/ztq4f/co.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); 
Connecticut Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/zg3m2/ct.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2014); District of Columbia Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., 
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/d4mmv/dc.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Hawaii Subjects Listed, 
U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/2fgqx/hi.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Idaho 
Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/2zjmz/id.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 
2014); Illinois Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/mm3zm/il.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2014); Iowa Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., 
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/my2fd/ia.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Kentucky Subjects Listed, 
U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/zb9nd/ky.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Maine 
Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/jg5zg/me.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 
2014); Michigan Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/ynjhm/mi.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Mississippi Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., 
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/k4mgm/ms.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Missouri Subjects 
Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/4ymg4/mo.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); 
Nebraska Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/m2gxy/ne.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2014); Nevada Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., 
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/zgyzf/nv.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014) New Hampshire Subjects 
Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/fdc5n/nh.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); 
New York Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/hndnh/ny.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2014); North Dakota Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., 
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/nzbkf/nd.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Oklahoma Subjects Listed, 
U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/jyxfd/ok.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); 
Pennsylvania Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/fgczm/pa.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2014); Rhode Island Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., 
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/2rjzt/ri.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Tennessee Subjects Listed, 
U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/hmdyx/tn.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Utah 
Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/rdfdb/ut.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 
2014); Virginia Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/yztgw/va.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2014); West Virginia Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., 
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/dqxnz/wv.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
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family law, internet regulation, international regulation, and the like.9 
In addition, litigation strategy issues (such as international forum 
shopping)10 as well as transaction practice issues (such as private 
ordering of affairs and contractual choice of law clauses)11 are 
important components of Conflicts thinking. Limitless ways exist for 
situating these issues and practical concerns within the deeper, 
jurisprudential issues of power that make Conflict of Laws so 
important. I present here a handful of particularly compelling 
examples, organized around the following three themes: 
I. The Nature of Law: What forms does legal analysis take? How 
does Conflicts disclose a societal preference for judicial, rather than 
legislative power? 
II. Federalism: What topics best illustrate the challenges and 
advantages of federalism? What does Conflict of Laws reveal about 
modes of regulation among the constituent parts of a federalist 
system? What lessons, opportunities, and concerns arise from 
federalism’s creation of forum choice for litigants? 
III. Globalism: How should courts resolve transnational conflict 
among laws? What does Conflicts tell us about the diversity in world 
litigation systems? What is the relationship between International 
Law and Conflict of Laws? 
I take up each of these themes in turn. 
I.   USING CONFLICT OF LAWS TO REVEAL THE NATURE OF THE LAW 
The first order of business in invigorating Conflict of Laws is to 
harness and expand on the great scholarly literature identifying both 
regulatory analysis within Conflicts doctrine as well as the regulatory 
effects of various Conflict of Laws approaches. With the help of 
Conflicts material—and just a little nudging—one can discover what 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See generally Kramer, supra note 2. 
 10. See e.g., Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International 
and Domestic (Revisited), 37 Tex. Int’l L.J. 559 (2002). 
 11. See e.g., Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close 
of the Twentieth Century, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 571, 589 (1999). 
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law seeks to accomplish and can observe some of the intended and 
unintended regulatory effects of law. Focusing on the form of 
conflicting regulations as well as Conflict of Laws analysis itself, 
Conflicts thinkers can also gain powerful insights about the forms 
that legal regulation and analysis can take—including both salutary 
forms and regrettable ones. This second angle includes a cornucopia 
of different analytical forms illustrated in Conflicts problems—as 
well as the unique insights into modes of legal reasoning and rhetoric 
in the subject’s case law. The forms of analysis reflected in Conflicts 
provides an opportunity to ponder the propriety of such matters as (i) 
an intuitive approach to law, (ii) the effectiveness of formalism and 
the related debate about rules and standards, (iii) the power of 
framing—and its embrace in the process of characterization formally 
integrated in the Restatements (First) and (Second), and (iv) the 
discipline’s propensity for complexity. A final significant topic about 
the nature of law arising from Conflicts concerns what one might 
describe as a preference for judicial, rather than legislative or 
executive power. This is reflected in the sanctity of judgments and 
the exalted role of judges in the Anglo-American tradition. 
A.   Regulatory Goals and Effects 
The choice of laws component of the Conflict of Laws discipline 
invites legal thinkers to dissect legal principles like no other subject. 
Regardless of the particular choice of law approach discussed, the 
analysis required uncovers many insights about the regulatory goals 
and effects of law. I do not suggest this is a new observation. But the 
process of developing a basic understanding of the complex and 
usually abstract, principles of choice of law doctrine can easily 
distract from the range of regulatory goals and effects depicted in 
Conflicts cases. For newcomers to the discipline, the process of 
learning the complex and abstract choice of law principles can be so 
challenging that they overlook larger lessons from the material. It is 
worth a second look to discover what choice of law analysis can 
uncover. 
6
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1.   Regulatory Goals 
Regulatory goals drive much choice of law analysis. 
Contemplating Conflict of Laws itself thus presents analysts with an 
opportunity to self-consciously identify and consider the policy 
preferences imbedded in legal principles. Those grappling with 
choice of law need to remind themselves—repeatedly remind 
themselves—of these transcendent messages from the choice of law 
cases. 
For illustrating law’s regulatory goals, the most obvious 
methodological examples are Governmental Interest Analysis and the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, both of which explicitly 
invite the analyst to identify policy goals behind legal principles in 
resolving a law conflict.12 Beyond simply reminding legal thinkers 
that laws are generally made for an instrumental reason, this process 
of goal identification can disclose repeated regulatory patterns. For 
example, from the observation that one purpose of a law is victim 
compensation, one might inquire into the prudence of pursuing 
restorative justice and of designing law to implement the rightful 
position principle.13 Likewise, one might expand the observation that 
a law seeks to hold blameworthy wrongdoers responsible for their 
actions to include consideration of deterrence policies as well as a 
government’s resolve to channel and control retributive instincts. 
Those initially confronting Conflicts thinking often 
unquestioningly accept the default of forum law governing any 
dispute before a forum court, viewing the principle as either a 
predetermined fact of nature or an irrefutable “rule of the road,” 
necessary to keep the gears of a litigation system turning.14 Yet, 
questioning why the forum law default rule might exist—or 
exploring it in the context of the lex fori choice of law approach—
                                                                                                                 
 12. See, e.g., CLYDE SPILLENGER, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 65–79, 104–05 (2010) 
(discussing policy components of Governmental Interest Analysis and Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws). 
 13. That is, the principle that the purpose of civil law is often to put the injured party in the position 
that she would have been in but for the harm. 
 14. See, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A “Restatement” of the “Lex 
Loci Approach,” 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340, 348–50 (1965) (explaining that domestic law should govern 
unless a forum law is required by some choice of law principle). 
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opens questions about where courts derive their authority to apply 
any law and whether they may legitimately enforce policy 
preferences of a foreign jurisdiction. These issues in turn invite 
consideration of a court’s obligation to respect legal products of its 
home jurisdiction’s democratic processes.15 
Other choice of law approaches bring out important systemic 
themes that serve as interesting foils for (what are traditionally 
called) “substantive” policy goals. Take, for example, the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and Leflar’s Choice 
Influencing Considerations.16 Both approaches make reference to 
“predictability of results,” “maintenance of interstate and 
international order,” and “simplification of the judicial task.”17 These 
factors provide an opportunity to explore the idea of what it means 
for a court to “decide specific cases justly.”18 Newcomers to 
Conflicts thinking are likely to willingly accept the notion that 
procedural and systemic values have an important place in the 
resolving parties’ disputes over their personal rights. Further 
guidance can come from an existing body of Conflicts writing—
distinguishing between “conflicts justice,”19 and “material” or 
“substantive” justice20—that explores the complicated 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 41–45 
(5th ed. 2010) (reviewing rationales behind the Lex Fori approach). 
 16. LAURA E. LITTLE, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 379–86 (2013) 
(discussing the systemic factors of the Leflar’s approach and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws). 
 17. SPILLENGER, supra note 12, at 114 (noting that overlap of systemic choice influencing 
considerations between Leflar’s approach and Section Six of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws). 
 18. David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 189–194 
(1933). 
 19. Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772, 959–60 
(1983). When courts pursue “conflicts justice” they seek to ensure they apply the law from the proper 
state, and evaluate systemic values such as the needs of judicial systems, uniformity of results, avoiding 
forum shopping, predictability, and the court’s ease of determining the applicable law. See, e.g., id.; 
Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and 
Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV. 347, 348–50 (1974). 
 20. Symeon Symeonides, Result-Selectivism in Conflicts Law, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 1 (2009). 
“Material justice” and “substantive justice” refer to the results courts seek in wholly domestic cases—
without regard to concern with conflicting jurisdictions or multijurisdictional elements. Id. Gerhard 
Kegel explains “substantive law aims at the materially best solution, [conflicts law] aims at the spatially 
best solution.” Gerhard Kegel, Paternal Home and Dream Home: Traditional Conflict of Laws and the 
American Reformers, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 615, 616 (1979). Some scholars argue that courts have the 
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interrelationship among the details of a procedural system and its 
ultimate goals. Thus, further reflection reveals that a choice of law 
methodology acts as a procedural system that promotes policies 
related to the governmental system itself as well as policies that seek 
to impact private, out-of-court conduct. 
Even the classic territorial approach of the Restatement (First) of 
Conflict of Laws sheds unique insights into regulatory goals and their 
relationship to parties’ rights.21 The First Restatement approach 
focuses more on events than legal policies in resolving choice of law 
disputes—thus providing an important lesson about territorialism and 
sovereignty. Nonetheless, the First Restatement’s emphasis on events 
places the role of law’s policies in perspective.22 Some may cling 
readily to the notion of fulfilling a particular law’s “substantive” 
purposes, but the First Restatement reveals other matters of justice 
and expectation that bear serious attention. For example, picking up 
on this wisdom from the First Restatement, Professor Perry Dane 
identified a “Norm-Based view of the law:” 
Particular legal norms may be promulgated to achieve any 
number of goals—such as maximizing utility, wealth, or 
fairness; . . . Once promulgated, however, a legal norm becomes 
part of a normative system that determines the legal status of 
various events and conditions in human life. According to the 
Norm-Based view of law, the reason for applying that norm in 
any particular case is not so much to achieve the underlying goal 
of the norm, but to uphold the normative system itself and the 
rights and duties created by that system.23 
                                                                                                                 
same duties of fairness and justice when adjudicating multijurisdictional cases justly as they do in 
wholly domestic cases—and that resolving disputes in a “manner substantively fair and equitable to 
litigants should be an objective of conflicts law as much as internal law.” Symeonides, supra at 20. In 
the context of a choice of law determination, “substantive” or “material” justice authorizes a court to 
scrutinize the competing laws to evaluate which produces the most just result in the case. Id. 
 21. Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1279, 1281, 1285, 1291 
(1989). 
 22. See, e.g., id. at 1292 (explaining that torts cases were governed by the location where the case’s 
issue occurred to determine the governing territorial laws). 
 23. Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191, 1218 (1987). 
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Although the increasing rise of globalism and dominance of 
cyberspace casts doubt on the utility of territorialism in solving legal 
problems, territorialism continues to exert strong control over legal 
analysis. For that reason, legal thinkers continue to benefit from 
understanding how the territorial approach’s focus on the 
geographical location of events privileges governmental sovereignty 
and individual expectations, which formal legal definition creates. 
These are important governmental lessons pertinent to developing 
greater understanding of federalism and internationalism, discussed 
below. 
In addition to the policy mechanics of choice of law approaches, 
another key topic implicating regulatory goals is party autonomy, a 
concept fully exposed by choice of law and choice of forum clauses. 
Reflected in questions about waiver, arbitration, and mediation, 
private ordering of affairs has taken on considerable importance in 
today’s procedural law.24 Party autonomy in the choice of law field is 
no exception.25 Appreciation of party autonomy issues requires one 
to understand that allowing parties to designate which law governs 
their affairs (and the forum for adjudicating their fights) can enable 
parties to select their preferred regulatory constraints, thereby 
empowering them to circumnavigate precisely those regulatory goals 
that were designed to govern them. Conflict of Laws thus provides an 
apt medium for appreciating government sovereignty (in the form of 
laws implementing public policy goals) as a check on private rights 
to designate which norms govern individual behavior. Indeed, 
consideration of whether courts should enforce choice of law clauses 
                                                                                                                 
 24. For examples of the burgeoning literature on private ordering in the context of litigation systems, 
see Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723 (2011); Daphna 
Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized 
Procedures, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1475 (2013) (focusing on an analysis of public implications of pre-dispute 
and post-dispute modifications of procedure in litigation). 
 25. The Brilmayer, Goldsmith, O’Hara O’Connor casebook, Conflict of Laws: Cases and Materials, 
is particularly strong on the interdisciplinary presentation of the economics of conflict of laws doctrine. 
BRILMAYER ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 637–787 (6th ed. 2011). For further 
materials on this topic, see, for example, Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 
GEO. L.J. 883 (2002); Erin A. O’Hara, Economics, Public Choice, and the Perennial Conflict of Laws, 
90 GEO. L.J. 941 (2002); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of 
Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151 (2000). 
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without restriction squarely presents the question of whether routine, 
private regulation might shatter a sovereignty-based system of 
regulation. 
2.   Regulatory Effect 
Complementing the wealth of learning available on the role of 
regulatory goals in Conflict of Laws are illustrations of laws’ 
intended and unintended regulatory effects. One might analyze these 
effects using Conflict of Laws doctrines in connection with social 
science theory, such as behavioral economics.26 Consider two case 
studies: the first uses a choice of law approach itself—Lex Fori—as a 
starting point for analyzing efficiency; the second—the “race to the 
bottom” concept—illustrates the intersection between choice of law 
and regulatory incentives among states. Here are some details. 
a.   Case Study: Lex Fori 
Most legal thinkers readily appreciate the upsides and downsides 
of Lex Fori. As for the upside, Lex Fori presents a potent, 
straightforward default: Forum law should apply when a conflict 
exists.27 One can certainly embrace the ease of this methodology. 
One can also readily see its problems in promoting forum shopping 
and disrespect for sister state sovereignty. But it pays to probe 
deeper: Lex Fori presents the opportunity to push beyond the obvious 
so as to discover insights beyond surface incentives. 
One can start by asking about possible efficiency benefits of the 
Lex Fori approach. Starting on a micro level, one might observe that 
Lex Fori is surely predictable and uncomplicated for individual 
actors in the litigation system. Forum law is undoubtedly the law that 
courts and local attorneys know best—the law they can more 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, Social Science Perspectives on Teaching Conflict of Laws, 27 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 619 (1996) (explaining ways to integrate law and economics into Conflict of Laws 
teaching). For a particularly useful compilation of articles presenting various law and economics angles 
on Conflicts of Laws, see generally ERIN O’HARA O’CONNOR, THE ECONOMICS OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
(2007). 
 27. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 425 (3d pocket ed. 2006). 
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accurately follow and apply as intended. Moreover, when local law is 
accurately applied and knowledgeably explained, useful precedent is 
likely created, thereby broadening and clarifying forum law. If 
parties know that forum law is most likely to govern transactions, 
they benefit from the certainty of that knowledge and are well poised 
to achieve efficient transaction results so long they can avoid 
inefficient laws by enjoying latitude to choose the forum for any 
resulting lawsuit. Finally, the specter of potentially competing laws 
in other jurisdictions may foster legal efficiency to the extent that 
lawmakers respond to this competition by fine-tuning their 
jurisdiction’s regulatory rules.28 
Now some of the downsides of Lex Fori: while individual litigants 
and single-jurisdiction actors may find that Lex Fori fosters 
predictability, multijurisdictional actors will not because the 
approach allows different laws to govern, depending on where the 
lawsuit is filed. And of course forum shopping occurs as well, since 
plaintiffs are likely to file in jurisdictions with the most favorable 
governing law as well as reputations for beneficial procedures and 
large verdicts. Forum shopping might also lead to short-term 
inefficiencies where plaintiff-favorable jurisdictions are unprepared 
for disproportionate numbers of filings.29 No matter how one comes 
out on the questions of efficiency, the process of evaluating 
competing arguments exposes intended and unintended consequences 
of legal regulation. 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See, e.g., Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum 
Shopping: Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2004) (reasoning as 
follows: “Predictability about the use of forum law reduces uncertainty for parties structuring 
transactions. As long as parties can exit the system, the lex fori approach forces a state to internalize the 
external costs of bad laws, promoting competition among jurisdictions to improve substantive law.”). 
 29. Id. at 1372–73. Ghei and Parisi explain the cascading consequences of this. They suggest that 
Lex Fori likely fuels trial lawyers and other interest groups in their quest for plaintiff-friendly laws, and 
the law can become even more “skewed in their favor.” Id. They argue the “resulting legislation is 
‘made’ law . . . giving rise to a ‘made’ order,” which has a “tendency toward inefficiency” as a result of 
the “imperfect information and the influence of interest groups.” Id. at 1373. 
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b.   Case Study: Race to the Bottom 
Race to the bottom analysis also provides an important exercise in 
projecting the long-term consequences of a regulatory scheme. One 
might start by observing that Conflict of Laws would not exist were it 
not for regulatory competition among governmental entities and by 
acknowledging that the cumulative effects of this competition can be 
both beneficial and detrimental to human governance. Understanding 
these effects can assist legal analysts in rating Conflict of Laws 
systems, allowing them to judge whether to replace the diverse, state 
choice of law approaches with a uniform, national (or federalized) 
choice of law approach.30 
 “Race to the bottom” generally refers to the tendency of interstate 
competition to decrease regulation to attract businesses.31 This 
deregulation—the argument goes—threatens to reduce social welfare 
because states in a race to the bottom system serve their own self-
interest to the detriment of the overall regulatory scheme.32 Each 
state’s desire to attract business (and avoid losing economic activity) 
provides an incentive for all states to deregulate. This deregulation 
can reduce social welfare because it encourages such measures as 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See Solimine, supra note 26, at 627–28. For an important, early article on using this concept in 
Conflict of Laws teaching, see id. at 627. 
 31. See, e.g., Louis K. Ligget Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557–58 (1933). The phrase appears to derive 
from a dissent by Justice Brandeis, describing the trend in weaker states to create less restrictive laws to 
attract corporations as a “race . . . not of diligence but of laxity.” Id. at 559. 
 32. Id. at 557–59. The theoretical foundation for the race to the bottom is the “Prisoner’s Dilemma.” 
See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1217 (1992) 
(explaining the phenomenon). An example used to explain the Prisoner’s Dilemma paradigm involves a 
prosecutor who separately interrogates two suspects, trying to get each to confess. Id. If neither suspect 
confesses, the prosecutor can obtain only limited success (say, a misdemeanor conviction with a ten-
month sentence). Id. If only one suspect confesses, the prosecutor might offer that suspect a plea deal 
with a shorter sentence (say, three months). Id. The prosecutor could then seek a felony conviction for 
the non-confessing suspect and might obtain a longer sentence (say, twenty years). Id. If both suspects 
confess, they might be both convicted of a felony and receive a shorter, but still significant sentence 
(say, five years). Id. The paradigm generally posits that each suspect will confess to the crime because 
each suspect mistrusts the other and believes that confessing will be the safest option. Id. at 1218. For 
example, if a suspect refuses to confess, there is the chance that the other suspect will confess and leave 
the first suspect with the highest sentence of twenty years. Id. Though the outcome of confessing (either 
five years if both parties confess or three months if the other suspect does not) is better than the outcome 
of being the only party not to confess (twenty-year sentence), the best overall (“Pareto optimal”) 
outcome for both suspects is to not confess at all (ten months). Id. In this model, the suspects’ sole focus 
on the best personal outcome keeps them from cooperating so as to achieve the best overall outcome. Id. 
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permissive environmental laws, allowing increased pollution and 
prompting resident health problems.33 Deregulation may benefit a 
state with increased revenue from new businesses and industries but 
can also harm the state’s residents. The risk is that each state will act 
without regard for long term or collateral consequences. Obsessed 
with the idea that a failure to deregulate would lead to high costs 
(such as economic activity), the state does nothing to discourage 
other states from also deregulating themselves. If the states 
considered their actions in the aggregate—the argument continues—
they might recognize that the optimum outcome is for all states to 
adopt an appropriately stringent standard of regulations. 
Scholars have observed a particularly clear race-to-the-bottom 
dynamic in the evolution of products liability laws.34 They observe 
that states have an interest in adopting pro-plaintiff products liability 
laws to protect their resident consumers.35 On the other hand, 
however, states also want to attract new businesses and industries, 
and businesses prefer reduced liability levels so they need not 
increase prices to offset the cost of liability. Accordingly, states have 
an incentive to enact pro-defendant laws to attract more businesses.36 
Choice of law enters the picture because some choice of law 
principles prompt courts to apply pro-defendant laws more often than 
others, particularly since choice of law approaches differ in their 
degree of preference for a strong forum law default.37 In today’s 
mobile world, products do not remain where they are made, but are 
instead sold or shipped to many different states. This means that a 
consumer injured by a product likely has a choice to bring suit in the 
state in which she purchased the product, where the product was 
made, or where any of the parties reside. Each of those states could 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1251 n.136. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product Liability System, 80 
GEO. L.J. 617, 629–30 (1992); Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of 
Government Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 975, 1028–30 (1994) (explaining the 
dynamic). 
 37. See, e.g., Michael I. Krauss, Product Liability and Game Theory: One More Trip to the Choice 
of Law Well, 2002 BYU L. REV. 759, 776–84 (2002) (reviewing the contribution of Conflict of Laws 
doctrine to fueling a race to the bottom). 
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have laws with differing levels of liability for the defendant producer. 
Assuming that plaintiffs do not encounter obstacles limiting where 
they can sue, they can file in the forum that will most likely apply the 
most pro-plaintiff law. The choice of law approach applied by the 
various jurisdictions will substantially dictate which of the 
jurisdictions is most likely to do so. For example, a state R resident, 
who purchases a product made in state P, could bring suit in either R 
or P. If state P has a more pro-plaintiff law and a choice of law 
approach oriented to applying forum law, a state R resident would 
have an incentive to file suit there. That option would allow the state 
R resident to take advantage of state P’s pro-plaintiff law without 
purchasing the product there and without paying a higher product 
price made necessary because of the plaintiff-protecting nature of 
state P’s product liability laws. 
Cooperation can ensure the greatest outcome for all those subject 
to products liability regulation. However, each state might act in a 
self-serving manner with nothing binding each of them to act 
cooperatively. One possible lesson of this phenomenon is the 
advantage of a uniform choice of law approach—via federal directive 
or otherwise. Such uniformity might foster more efficient and 
effective legal regulation because plaintiffs would have less incentive 
to “shop” for the forum that is most likely to apply pro-plaintiff 
product liability principles.38 
The underlying message of these theories is that difference among 
laws—and resulting competition—affects the decision-making and 
behavior of market participants—all of whom are potential actors in 
litigation and many of whom plan their activities in light of potential 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law 
Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 2–16 (1991) (articulating an argument favoring a uniform choice of law code). 
Professor Michael Krauss has made a similar argument, advocating for a federal choice of law statute 
for products liability suits. Krauss, supra note 37, at 807. Professor Bruce Hay also advocates for a 
uniform federal law that controls the laws governing products liability suits. Hay, supra note 36, at 644–
46. Like Krauss, Hay’s approach tends to prevent consumers from avoiding less protective laws of 
defendant-friendly states without bearing the cost of the more protective regulation. Id. In contrast to 
Krauss, Hay focuses primarily on predictability and planning, arguing that governing law for a products 
liability suit should derive only from the state where the product was sold or where the producing 
company resides. Id. By limiting the governing law to these two states, Hay reasons, a business can 
better predict which laws will apply to disputes and can plan accordingly. Id. 
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lawsuits. Where this difference among laws can be eliminated—such 
as through a uniform choice of law code—the uniform law can 
account for and remediate possible deleterious consequences of 
underlying regulatory differences and competition.39 
B.   Legal Analytic Form 
Some of the richest intellectual lessons arising from Conflict of 
Laws spring from the discipline’s potential for exposing forms of 
legal analysis. Conflicts study can easily seize—and expose—matters 
tied to remarkable and sometimes unique qualities of the legal 
process, reasoning, and rhetoric. These striking qualities seem to 
result from the intractable nature of many Conflict of Law problems: 
there is simply no “right” answer to many of the power clashes 
presented in Conflict disputes. Some problems—such as the clash 
between state and federal law—contain a “tie breaker” that points to 
a ready answer, such as the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution.40 More commonly, however, conflicting laws come 
from sovereigns of equal status. When this occurs, courts must draw 
on creativity to designate a rational “winner.” Resulting analysis 
takes many forms: searching, clever, disingenuous, and even comical. 
These qualities of Conflict of Law opinions are disorienting for 
some. Yet all conflicts thinkers—scholars looking for a lens on the 
nature of law, practitioners seeking insights, Conflicts professors 
looking to enhance depth to their teaching, and others—can benefit 
from exploring the varying opinions. By appreciating and embracing 
the case law’s quirks, legal thinkers develop a greater understanding 
of the legal process, the dynamics of the adversary system, and 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Gottesman, supra note 38, at 39. Another topic for illustrating game theory topics concerns 
private incentives in judgment recognition. Cf. Yaad Rotem, The Problem of Selective or Sporadic 
Recognition: A New Economic Rationale for the Law of Foreign Country Judgments, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
505, 508 (2010) (contrasting the incentives of sovereignties deciding whether to recognize foreign 
judgments with “the incentives of individuals to seek or avoid recognition of a particular foreign 
judgment”); Michael Whincop, The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues of the Recognition of 
Foreign Judgments, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 416, 425–28 (1999) (outlining forum shopping incentives 
deriving from recognition law). See also Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Adequate Search for 
“Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 775 (1998) 
(addressing forum shopping, plaintiff shopping, and lawyer shopping incentives in class actions). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
16
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss2/1
2015] CONFLICT OF LAWS STRUCTURE AND VISION 247 
generally become more expert in the rhetorical and linguistic devices 
useful where human interaction requires lawyers to operate with 
subtlety, creativity, and sometimes even stealth or obfuscatory intent. 
The notable analytical forms in Conflict of Laws cases are 
numerous. Here are four representative topics: intuition, framing 
effects, rules or standards choices, and complexity. 
1.   The Role of Intuition 
Conflict of Laws analysis can be rough going. Properly applied, 
the discipline’s rules and methodologies require rigorous mental 
gymnastics and double-your-trouble research (i.e., for any Conflict of 
Laws problem, one should study the scope and purposes behind the 
laws of at least two jurisdictions). That parties and judges quite often 
try to ignore the Conflicts issues that arise in litigation evidences this 
difficulty.41 For these reasons, the temptation to invoke intuition to 
resolve Conflicts issues is strong. 
Not that this inclination is particularly unusual: intuition plays an 
important part of life and decision-making. Intuition also forms a key 
component of the formalized rules that govern human affairs (the 
law) as well as the common sense necessary to provide competent 
legal representation. And sound reasons support this. Much good can 
be said for the chance to grasp a result without need for conscious 
reasoning. Intuition’s mental approach resembles heuristics, which 
are essential for efficiency and speed in negotiating all that life serves 
up.42 Also, intuition is often conveyed easily to others, including 
                                                                                                                 
 41. SPILLENGER, supra note 12, at 109–10. 
 42. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 185 (2011). Kahneman does not condemn all 
intuitive judgments, as he praises intuitions that draw on “skill and expertise” and lead to “rapid and 
automatic” judgments. Id. While the work of Kahneman and Amos Tversky on this subject is perhaps 
best well known, a rich body of legal scholarly literature also explores the efficacy of intuition. This 
literature seeks to understand such questions as whether intuition is “non-rational” or illogical, whether 
judicial reasoning masks intuitive judgments, and whether intuition enhances the morality in decision 
making. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 517, 
523–24 (1998) (contrasting the process of reasoning with intuition); Paul Gewirtz, On “I Know It When 
I See It,” 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1024–31 (1996) (discussing limits of articulating standards and 
expectations about opinions reflecting a “conscious process of deduction”); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., 
The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278, 
285–87 (1929) (exploring the tension between accommodating intuition and the need to make a judicial 
opinion appear reasonable); Douglas Lind, Logic, Intuition, and the Positivist Legacy of H.L.A. Hart, 52 
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those who are legally trained and those who are not. Finally, intuition 
is extremely useful, perhaps essential, to the rule of law. An intuitive 
connection between what law is and the reasons behind the law can 
make law more effective. If legal rules make good “intuitive sense,” 
then they are readily embraced by the governed—that is, citizens 
who must live by the rules. 
Of course, prudence counsels against overreliance on intuition. 
One needs to be wary that intuition does not serve as an unfortunate 
“substitute [of] an easy question for [a] harder one.”43 Deep 
understanding does not emerge from what Daniel Kahneman might 
describe as “System 1” thinking—from which conclusions arise from 
automatic, stereotypic, emotional, and sometimes even subconscious 
impulses.44 This is especially true for legal understanding. Law is a 
rigorous discipline, tied closely to formal logic and rationality. To 
competently navigate among legal doctrines and apply them to a 
given fact situation, one must sift through many facts and concepts, 
integrating relevant factors, checking for irrelevant ones, and the like. 
In other words, the competent legal analyst needs to muster plenty of 
“System 2” thinking—deliberative, effortful, and calculating 
thought.45 
In charting the appropriate balance between intuition and 
deliberative thought, Conflict of Laws provides a particularly fertile 
medium. Why? Well, as suggested above, intuition’s invitation to 
avoid the frustration of difficult, sometimes altogether incoherent, 
Conflicts doctrine can especially tempt one to ignore the benefits of 
formal legal analysis. Nonetheless, some measure of intuition may 
help navigate difficult cultural and value clashes that are reflected in 
legal differences highlighted by the choice of law processes.46 
                                                                                                                 
SMU L. REV. 135, 148–65 (1999) (exploring connections among logic, intuition, and legal formalism); 
R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1381, 1406–20 
(2006) (describing various forms of judicial reasoning and its dependence on intuition). 
 43. KAHNEMAN, supra note 42. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 361. 
 46. See Annalise Riles, Cultural Conflicts, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 274–75 (2008) 
(describing how Conflict of Laws extends beyond analytical puzzles and requires a forum court to 
evaluate and understand a foreign value system). 
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Intuition might penetrate the effects of complex analysis, which can 
conceal power dynamics and subtleties reflected in laws with 
conflicting terms. 
Two readily available Conflicts approaches useful for comparing 
intuition with lock-step legal analysis are the Center of Gravity 
approach47 and Governmental Interest Analysis. Under the Center of 
Gravity approach, courts generally identify contacts that bear “weight 
and significance” in the dispute,48 and apply the law of the 
jurisdiction that hosts the nucleus or gravity center of relevant 
contacts. Yet courts following the approach do not provide much 
guidance about which contacts matter, and which contacts do not, for 
the purposes of pinpointing the gravity center.49 By contrast, 
Governmental Interest Analysis calls for step-by-step consideration 
of laws’ goals, evaluation of contacts relevant to those goals, and 
determination of whether the dispute implicates those goals.50 Many 
legal thinkers—particularly those new to Conflict of Laws—are 
especially drawn to Governmental Interest Analysis—perhaps (I 
hypothesize) because its resolution of false conflicts is so 
intellectually compelling.51 But once one experiences the tortured 
reasoning that has proliferated in the name of Governmental Interest 
Analysis, its apparently constrained method starts to lose its shine, 
and the benefits of an intuition-driven approach may become more 
appealing. 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See, e.g., Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1961). The Center of Gravity approach is 
seen as a transition between the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws and more developed modern 
approaches. LITTLE, supra note 16, at 292–96. Indeed, New York courts have moved well beyond the 
orientation of Haag, but the court’s reliance on intuition in reaching its result is hardly unknown in 
contemporary choice of law cases. Id. at 296–97. Consider, for example, the most significant 
relationship test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Id. at 298. 
 48. Haag, 175 N.E.2d at 444. 
 49. See, e.g., LITTLE, supra note 16, at 295–96. 
 50. Id. at 379. Indeed, one of the first expositions of Governmental Interest Analysis presents the 
approach in statute-like formality. See Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent 
Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1242–43 (1963). 
 51. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 50 (applying the Governmental Interest Analysis). A false conflict is 
one in which only one jurisdiction (out of two or more) has an actual interest in applying its law—even 
though laws have nominally conflicting terms. Mzamane v. Winfrey, 693 F. Supp. 442, 468 (E.D. Pa. 
2010). If anything comports with common sense, applying the law of the only interested jurisdiction 
certainly does. 
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2.   The Debate About Rules and Standards: Formalism vs. 
Functionalism 
Another debate about analytical reasoning presented in Conflicts 
decisions is the perennial dispute about the suitability of “rules” 
versus “standards” as instruments for governance.52 The evaluation 
of the relative merits of various choice of law approaches invariably 
implicates the question of whether rules or standards govern more 
effectively. 
Scholars define a “rule” as a “legal directive” requiring a decision-
maker to reach a certain result upon finding the presence of certain 
triggering facts.53 Some emphasize that rules “entail an advance 
determination of what conduct is permissible.”54 Rules enable 
formalistic decision-making, associated with categories defined by 
bright-line specifics. The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws is a 
rule-based approach.55 
By contrast to rules, standards require that the decision-maker 
apply a “background principle or policy” to a set of facts before 
rendering a binding decision about the facts.56 Standards allow the 
decision-maker to decide whether certain conduct should be allowed 
after the conduct has occurred and the court has evaluated the 
conduct’s effect.57 Standards implement functional decision-making, 
often associated with balancing tests, and promote reasoning by 
reference to the purposes underlying legal directives.58 Modern 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See, e.g., Adam I. Muchmore, Jurisdictional Standards (and Rules), 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
171, 175 (2013) (discussing jurisprudential rules and standards). 
 53. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 
58 (1992) (describing a rule as binding “a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the 
presence of delimited triggering facts”). See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 
379, 381 (1985) (conceptualizing legal rules as “a series of directives,” where each directive has “a 
‘trigger’ . . . and a ‘response’ that requires or authorizes a legal consequence when that [trigger] is 
present”). 
 54. Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992). 
Kaplow’s analysis is cited widely within legal scholarship. 
 55. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). 
 56. Sullivan, supra note 53, at 58. See also Mark D. Rosen, Nonformalistic Law in Time and Space, 
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 622, 623 (1999) (using the term “nonformalistic law” as synonymous with standards 
and defining standards as abstract concepts that “refer to the ultimate policy or goal animating the law”). 
 57. Rosen, supra note 56, at 623. 
 58. Sullivan, supra note 53, at 60. 
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choice of law methodologies tend to promote standards-based 
decision-making, as reflected in the Second Restatement of Conflict 
of Laws, Governmental Interest Analysis, Comparative Impairment, 
and the Better Rule of Law approach.59 
The rule-based approach to decision-making has been pilloried in 
the recent past, but has experienced a resurgence of support.60 
Proponents argue that rules reduce complex reasoning and constrain 
discretion, thereby promoting uniformity, efficiency, predictability, 
and even-handed justice.61 Justice Antonin Scalia often propounds 
the virtues of rule-based decision-making, arguing that rules of law 
should be pre-announced so as to limit arbitrary authority and to 
minimize legal administration costs.62 Not surprisingly, rule-based 
decision-making is popular among law and economics thinkers—one 
might even argue the rule-like quality of the Restatement (First) of 
Conflict of Laws accounts for its popularity among some law and 
economics thinkers.63 One scholar has argued that the standard-based 
thinking reflected in Governmental Interest Analysis creates high 
transaction costs, which leads to “frequent forum preference and thus 
globally suboptimal outcomes.”64 Law and economics thinkers, 
however, have not reached consensus on the subject, and some 
celebrate the benefits of ad hoc adaptation made possible by 
standards.65 
Although rule-based decision-making has gained in popularity, 
many are dubious of its merits, including those working in Conflict 
of Laws.66 In particular, courts and scholars observe that its 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See generally SPILLENGER, supra note 12. 
 60. E.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 806 (8th ed. 2010) (arguing that the 
First Restatement avoids multifactor balancing); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Conflict of Laws 
and Choice of Law, in ELGAR’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 637 (Boudewijn Bouckaert 
& Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (praising the rule-like quality of the First Restatement, although advising 
that it be modified “to avoid frequent arbitrary results”). 
 64. See Ralf Michaels, Economics of Law as Choice of Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 94 
(2008). 
 65. See id. at 93–94 n.126; Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 
VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 45–46 (2001). 
 66. See Lea Brilmayer & Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the Metaphysics of the Stand-
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simplicity is illusory, since the rigidity of rules can spawn exceptions 
and complexity.67 The escape valves associated with the First 
Restatement provide evidence of this.68 Moreover, once a judge 
decides to make an end run around a rule, judicial candor can suffer 
and complications multiply.69 Take, for example, a court’s decision 
to recharacterize a prenuptial agreement dispute as presenting a 
marriage issue, rather than a contract issue. The court making the 
recharacterization may be seeking to trigger the place of celebration’s 
law so as to avoid an inequity that would arise if it applied the law of 
the place of making the contract to the specific case. What does this 
mean for the proper characterization for future prenuptial agreements 
where the inequity is not an issue? Should the court use a marriage 
characterization on the basis of precedent, or should the court 
distinguish the precedent and use a contract characterization? 
In addition to pointing out deficiencies in rule-based decision-
making, some proponents of standard-based decision-making 
affirmatively celebrate how the ad hoc nature of standards can make 
them effective regulatory instruments.70 These thinkers argue that 
standards allow courts to do what courts do best: tailor the law to the 
specifics of the case to do justice.71 From this point of view, the 
flexibility of the methodologies, such as the Second Restatement or 
the Better Rule of Law approach, makes it more likely that the 
approaches are better able to respond to the challenges of dueling 
jurisdictional claims to governing in the ever-changing world.72 
Two scholars argue that one component of standards-based 
decision-making—balancing—is particularly well suited to choice of 
law.73 They maintain that choice of law disputes require 
consideration of so many variables that a single “trigger factor”—
                                                                                                                 
Alone Trigger, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1131–45 (2010). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Michael Faure, Morag Goodwin & Franziska Weber, The Regulator’s Dilemma: Caught 
Between the Need for Flexibility & the Demands of Foreseeability. Reassessing the Lex Certa Principle, 
24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 283, 292–93 (2014). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Brilmayer & Anglin, supra note 66, at 1173. 
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such as under the First Restatement—is simply not up to the task.74 
Balancing, they suggest, allows a court to “tak[e] into account the 
number of contacts supporting a particular state’s law” and results in 
minimizing the circumstances when laws are applied 
extraterritorially.75 
I agree that formal rule-based decision-making may not be up for 
the challenges served up by Conflicts problems. But the dynamic, in 
my view, is complicated. One problem results from how rigidly rule-
based approaches invite Conflicts thinkers to create numerous 
exceptions and provide incentives to “game” the rules. The result, 
ironically, leads to more complexity.76 This leads to yet another 
irony, since a decision-maker who wants to make an end-run around 
the rules may have an incentive to avoid candor and clarity in 
explaining her decision. And that may not be the end of the story: 
even in the face of an apparent failure of rule-based decision-making 
to reduce complexity, attempts at creating more standard-based, 
functional approaches to Conflict of Laws may inspire an evolution 
back toward more rule-based formalism. As I have argued elsewhere, 
the emotional and cognitive appeal of rules lies in the elusiveness of 
their goal, and this allows adjudicators to continue to place faith in 
the virtues of a simple, rule-based decision-making system.77 Even if 
these virtues are illusory, belief in the power of “impartial” rules may 
actually improve decision-making, contributing to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy because adjudicators put trust in the ability of rules to 
control and simplify their decision-making process.78 
While the evolution of Conflict of Laws doctrine over the last fifty 
years might provide support for these arguments,79 the debate about 
the efficacy of rules versus standards is certainly not complete. 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of Formalism, 37 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 925, 963 (2004). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 966–67. 
 79. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 900, 903 (Ill. 2007). In support of 
this, consider the tendency of courts to try to formalize the flexible, standards-based approach of the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Id. (explaining the importance of adhering to the 
presumptive rule that place-of-injury should provide the governing law in a tort action). 
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Whether or not the debate is ever settled in the Conflicts context, 
understanding the merits of rules versus standards can assist in 
evaluating the overall merits of competing choice of law approaches. 
And of course the feedback loop continues: learned wisdom about the 
efficacy of various choice of law approaches continues to inform the 
debate about rules and standards. 
3.   Framing Effects and Characterization 
I have celebrated the potential for Conflict of Laws to capitalize on 
framing effects many times.80 The possibility that a particular 
characterization or frame on a particular fact pattern might change 
readily seems to me to be an opportunity for creative lawyering and 
developing an understanding of the nature of perception and 
knowledge. Alas, though, the terms “frame-shifting” or 
characterization might evoke not-so-good connotations, with some 
arguing that the initial frame or characterization on a particular topic 
can disproportionately influence outcome.81 Thus, thought-
manipulators or “spinners” profit from creating a favorable first 
impression to gain support from others, who do not necessarily 
understand the full truth of a matter.82 
Despite these potential negative attributes, framing remains a core 
advocacy skill. The framing process has some unqualified, beneficial 
aspects as well: the process is key to understanding the impact of—
and potential validity of—competing perspectives on a particular 
problem.83 Effective legal thinkers need to know how to spin—or 
recharacterize—a legal issue to understand the nature of the legal 
process and to avoid others’ distortions. 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See, e.g., Little, supra note 76, at 929, 932; Laura E. Little, Characterization and Legal 
Discourse, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 372 (1996), reprinted in J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 121, 121 
(2009) [hereinafter Little, Characterization]. 
 81. E.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 42, at 364. Daniel Kahneman is often associated with path-
breaking work with framing—or as he describes it—the “influences of formulation.” Id. Kahneman also 
warns against the “unjustified influences of formulation on beliefs and preferences” on “framing 
effects.” Id. As Kahneman says, however, not “all frames are equal,” and “some frames are clearly 
better than alternative ways to describe (or to think about) the same thing.” Id. at 371. 
 82. Little, Characterization, supra note 80, at 121. 
 83. Id. at 135, 148. 
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Yet there is more to gain here than a rhetorical or advocacy skill. 
Study of characterization may also encourage legal thinkers to 
challenge categories and break out of “cabined” thinking and rigid 
taxonomies that are apparently common in legal doctrine. If one 
repeatedly sees that the rigid result of legal rules can be avoided by 
creative reframing, then she is more likely to develop confidence to 
avoid becoming a slave to choices forced on her by opponents or the 
popular conceptions. She is then freed to allow her own sense of 
justice to control over her legal analysis. Practice in questioning 
predetermined frames likewise empowers legal thinkers to reach a 
more sophisticated level of understanding, enabling them to deploy 
more creativity in solving legal and practical problems. 
These, of course, are generic observations about perception, 
creativity, and law. What makes Conflict of Laws so interesting, 
however, is that characterization is so pervasive within the discipline. 
First, at least two choice of law approaches formally require framing 
(although they officially call the mental process characterization): 
both the Restatement (First) and the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws require the legal analyst to first frame the legal 
issue in terms of substance and procedure—and if substantive—then 
according to doctrinal category (property, tort, contract, and the 
like).84 Even beyond this type of formal invitation to characterize, 
conflicts cases seem to create an endless stream of informal 
characterizations. Consider, for example, definitional questions about 
words incorporated from one part of a statutory scheme to another: 
could it be possible that his partner is a “spouse” for the purpose of 
the domestic relations law but not the probate code?85 Is charitable 
immunity a loss allocating rule or a conduct regulating rule?86 The 
type of thinking required to frame these questions is common in all 
forms of lawyering, whether it be counseling, brief-writing, arguing, 
negotiating, or interacting with the press. Yet, the struggles for a 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Little, supra note 76, at 932–33. 
 85. See, e.g., In re Estate of May, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1953), in which the court interpreted New 
York’s Domestic Relations law for the purpose of answering a probate question. 
 86. Shultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 685 n.2 (N.Y. 1985) (analyzing whether 
New Jersey meant for its charitable immunity law to be loss allocating or conduct regulating). 
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reasoned basis for choosing between relevant laws of co-equal 
sovereigns provides especially fertile ground for proliferating 
different frames and perspectives.87 
4.   Complexity 
Conflict of Laws also presents a valuable opportunity to view the 
benefits, detriments, and possible inevitability of complexity that so 
often occurs in thoughtful legal regulation. Simplicity in law is a 
sound goal: simplicity ensures that law is more accessible to the 
governed and is thus more likely to govern effectively. Indeed, 
readily understandable legal principles are more likely to appear 
coherent and well grounded, and thus are more capable of garnering 
respect and emotional attachment than Byzantine rules. One would 
expect that such legal principles are more likely to ensure that 
citizens actually obey the law. Yet, for Conflict of Laws, simplicity 
proves a particularly elusive goal. The discipline is prone to abstract 
distinctions, multiple meanings, and filigreed structures of analysis. 
Why is this? As with other areas of law such as tax or civil 
procedure, legal complexity results at least in part from the desire to 
ensure that law is thorough and fair. Several other more discipline-
specific explanations suggest themselves: the multi-jurisdictional 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See generally O’CONNOR, supra note 26. A particularly striking example of framing with large 
consequence concerns marriage. Questions regarding the validity of marriage are treated as choice of 
law matters, for which there is a lot of leeway in identifying an acceptable solution in those instances 
where one jurisdiction has a different public policy regarding marriage validity than the jurisdiction 
where a marriage was celebrated. See generally Grossman, infra note 101, at 435. If, on the other hand, 
marriages were regarded as judgments, a jurisdiction seeking to refuse to recognize a marriage would 
have much less leeway than they presently do because there is no public policy exception for 
recognition of judgments under the Full Faith and Credit principles in the United States. See Fauntleroy 
v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237–38 (1908) (refusing to recognize an exception to judgment recognition based 
on the recognizing jurisdiction’s view of the illegality of the claim underlying the judgment). The 
proposition that a marriage might be treated as a judgment is not preposterous. Cf. Grossman, infra note 
101, at 435. After all, marriage often involves an exercise of judicial authority. Cf. United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2708 (2013) (questioning how choice-of-law would apply to validity of same-
sex marriages). In addition, an asymmetry on marriage status exists in U.S. law: although the creation of 
marriage is not treated as a judgment, the dissolution of marriage—divorce—is treated as such, thus 
triggering plenary full faith and credit protection. For further discussion of the status of judgments in the 
U.S. legal system, see infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. Of all the exertions of governmental 
power in the United States, judgments are a category that we treat with particular care. Judgments are 
subject to full faith and credit’s iron rule: full faith exerts the greatest protective force on judgments. 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
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context of Conflicts, the common law system and litigation context in 
which Conflicts questions arise, reluctance of lawmakers and judges 
to candidly discuss their exercises of power, American legal culture’s 
preference for detailed explicit rules and specific authority for 
proposed action, and the unusual influence of academics in the 
development of Conflicts doctrine.88 
The complexity of Conflicts may help inspire commentators to 
invoke the “dismal swamp” metaphor often used in connection with 
the discipline.89 Legal complexity is certainly not a cause for 
celebration. Yet, the process of understanding complexity’s causes—
and of acknowledging that some complexity may be an inevitable 
consequence of an impulse to be fair and precise—provides valuable 
instruction on the nature of law. 
C.   Preference for Judicial Power: Cult of the Robe 
A useful message emerges from comparing the mode and rigor of 
regulation within the three different components of Conflict of Laws: 
personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgments. Two of these 
components concern judicial power (personal jurisdiction and 
judgments), while the third primarily concerns what is generally 
viewed as law-making or legislative power (choice of law). The rules 
within those components that concern judicial power have more rigor 
and rigidity than the component concerning law-making power. Does 
this suggest a preference for judges over legislators? 
First, some definitions: by rules with more “rigor and rigidity,” I 
refer to a number of things. Initially, I note that the source of the 
rules governing personal jurisdiction and judgments is United States 
constitutional principles, while the source of the choice of law rules 
in the United States is nearly always state common law—or to a 
limited extent—state statutory law. The United States Supreme Court 
has enunciated loose constitutional restrictions on what state courts 
can do in the choice of law arena, but the constitutional restrictions 
                                                                                                                 
 88. These causes are explored in detail in Little, supra note 76. 
 89. See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, Exploring the “Dismal Swamp”: The Revision of Louisiana’s 
Conflicts Law on Successions, 47 LA. L. REV. 1029 (1987). 
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have a light touch and are rarely mentioned in state choice of law 
cases.90 Yet, the Supreme Court has tried again and again in the 
personal jurisdiction area to articulate specific rules for state courts 
exercising power over out of state defendants.91 
Even more remarkable, however, has been the Court’s traditional 
treatment of judgments.92 Of all the exertions of governmental power 
in the United States, judgments are a category handled with particular 
care.93 To begin with, judgments are subject to full faith and credit’s 
iron rule: a judgment in one court is entitled to same sanctity and 
effect as it would receive in the court that rendered the judgment.94 
The Supreme Court has recognized a few exceptions to this principle 
over the years—particularly where personal jurisdiction and subject 
matter jurisdiction problems infect the judgment.95 But these 
exceptions are limited and certainly do not include the type of 
indulgence for the honoring court’s public policy that one sees in the 
choice of law area.96 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (plurality opinion) (requiring only that the 
Constitution requires that a “[s]tate must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of 
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally 
unfair.”). 
 91. See e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315–19 (1945); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 
714, 722–33 (1877). In case after case leading up to Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of 
California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), the Court attempted to refine personal jurisdiction contacts analysis. Id. 
After Asahi, the Court enjoyed a several-decade hiatus in personal jurisdiction decision-making. Cf. 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (deciding personal jurisdiction 
limitations post-Asahi). The Court, however, has focused on the issue again and decided a number of 
personal jurisdiction cases in recent years. See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); J. 
McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846 . 
 92. See, e.g., Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 237. 
 93. Id. at 232 (discussing the grant of judicial power granted by the Constitution). 
 94. Stewart E. Sterk, Full Faith and Credit, More or Less, to Judgments: Doubts About Thomas v. 
Washington Gas Light Co., 69 GEO. L.J. 1329, 1332 (1980). 
 95. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 223 (1998). 
 96. See id. at 233 (stating that there is no “public policy exception” for judgments); Fauntleroy, 210 
U.S. at 237–38 (refusing to recognize an exception to judgment recognition based on the recognizing 
jurisdiction’s view of the illegality of the claim underlying the judgment). Judgments of foreign 
countries do not receive full faith and credit treatment, and generally enjoy a bit less respect in U.S. 
courts than do domestic judgments. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1. In fact, some contexts even reveal 
considerable evidence of disrespect where the foreign judgments do not reflect U.S. policy choices. See, 
e.g., SPEECH ACT of 2010, 28 U.S.C. § 4102 (2013) (prohibiting recognition of foreign judgments that 
do not comply with freedom of communication principles as reflected in the First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution and as reflected in the law of the state of the United States in which the judgment is 
sought to be enforced and recognized). Nonetheless, foreign judgments do enjoy greater respect in U.S. 
courts than foreign law as a general matter, which, if considered at all, will be honored only if choice of 
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So why the solicitude for judgments? Perhaps one can trace this to 
an Anglo-American reverence for courts. In United States 
government and culture, judges are treated very well—we put them 
in special robes, elevate them onto benches, call them “Your Honor,” 
grant them special contempt powers, and allow them to dispatch 
many of their governmental duties in secret. Moreover, their orders 
are protected by the collateral bar rule, requiring parties to challenge 
orders through appeal only and subject themselves to punishment for 
contempt if in fact they choose to disregard an order without 
pursuing an appeal.97 One explanation for this special regard for 
judgments might posit that judicial orders draw a line in the sand: 
commanding specific parties to do specific things. In this way, the 
judicial orders actually implement the rule of law itself. It is here, at 
the point of a judicial decision when the court applies general 
principles to individual behavior, where government makes 
absolutely clear that the law applies to specific citizens, and that the 
citizens’ failure to comply with the law dangerously flouts 
governmental power. Hence, the strict rules governing recognition of 
judgments: to venerate and protect this judicial exercise of 
governmental power—the tailoring of legal principles to individual 
conduct—preserves the rule of law itself. 
II.   USING CONFLICT OF LAWS TO EXPOSE FEDERALISM’S REALITIES 
Legal thinkers in the United States often view Conflict of Laws as 
a federalism problem.98 The dominant perspective sees Conflicts as 
confronting almost exclusively interstate relations issues, exposing a 
morass of clashing state laws roughly supervised by federal 
constitutional guarantees. Thus, a rich body of scholarship, treatises, 
and casebooks explores various U.S. state laws and techniques for 
                                                                                                                 
law analysis suggests that it is the most appropriate law to apply. For an overview of the treatment of 
foreign law and foreign judgment in U.S. courts as the law of a sister state, see Little, supra note 16, at 
191–94, 963–68, 984–87 (2013). 
 97. John R.B. Palmer, Note, Collateral Bar and Contempt: Challenging a Court Order After 
Disobeying It, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 215 (2002). 
 98. See, e.g., Little, supra note 76. 
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resolving conflicts among them.99 That said, there remain important 
federalism angles on the material that may be usefully mined for 
salient and enlightening insights on the discipline. One contemporary 
angle is highly focused: the topic of same-sex marriage. The other 
topics that promise to clarify the dynamics of federalism in the 
United States are less subject-specific. These concern (1) the modes 
of regulation among the constituent parts of a federalist union and (2) 
the lessons arising from federalism’s creation of forum choice for 
litigants. I explore these immediately below. 
A.   Same-Sex Marriage: A Paradigm of Federalism’s Power 
Struggles? 
Few would doubt that in contemporary times, same-sex marriage 
has created one of the most powerful case studies in federalism. 
Same-sex marriage presents a diverse cross-section of state laws: 
marriage-equality laws, marriage-recognition laws, state public 
policy statutes prohibiting marriage recognition, and laws providing 
marriage “equivalents,” such as domestic partnerships and civil 
unions. From a federalism perspective, this diversity presents 
enormous challenges. On the one hand is the pressure to recognize a 
marriage valid in the place where it was celebrated. The stakes are 
high with marriage recognition: emotional stability, children, 
inheritance, health care, taxes, and other myriad spousal rights all 
hang in the balance. Common sense compels a strong orientation 
toward uniformity: persons validly married in one jurisdiction should 
be deemed validly married everywhere. On the other hand are the 
moral and religious differences that same-sex marriage implicates. 
One of federalism’s virtues is its ability to allow diversity to flourish. 
From this perspective, federalism should strive to accommodate a 
peaceful coexistence of diverse views as they are reflected in wildly 
varying laws promulgated by a diverse citizenry. This presents two 
horns of a dilemma: should uniformity or diversity carry the day? Is 
there a consensus, or half measure, that can keep the peace? Here lies 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See, e.g., LITTLE, supra note 16. 
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a central function of Conflict of Laws: to provide a reasoned 
mechanism for resolving differences among states, for tolerating 
diversity, and for promoting respectful interstate relations. 
Existing literature covers same-sex marriage in great depth. 
Although the literature might connect same-sex marriage issues with 
Conflict of Laws more fruitfully than it has done, many scholars have 
done so.100 Same-sex marriage deserves highlighting, not only for its 
inherent importance, but also for its ability to illustrate federalism’s 
many dimensions. With a rapidly occurring series of decisions 
striking down same-sex marriage bans as unconstitutional, we are 
approaching a threshold where same-sex marriage debates may have 
historical interest only.101 Nonetheless, the parallels between 
struggles over same-sex marriage and historical struggles over 
slavery deserve attention. Marriage is a status defined by state law, 
just as slavery was a status defined by state law.102 Contemporary 
controversy still surrounds whether, and to what extent, the federal 
government should reach beyond its umpiring functions and inject 
federal principles to resolve same-sex marriage controversies.103 
Same-sex marriage’s historical analogue with slavery is far from 
direct, but the federalism parallels are striking and deserve 
contemplation. 
The Conflict of Laws history of governing same-sex marriage 
disputes is enlightening. At the time the Restatement (First) of 
Conflict of Laws was written in the 1930s, the drafters likely did not 
anticipate how its rules might apply to same-sex marriage issues. In 
fact, the same-sex marriage movement did not become widespread 
until the 1970s.104 Once the movement took hold, legal principles 
                                                                                                                 
 100. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform 
Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 434–35 (2005) (evaluating relevance of Full Faith and Credit 
Clause to marriage recognition). 
 101. See, e.g., Searcy ex. rel. K.S. v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2014 WL 4322396 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 
28, 2014). 
 102. Grossman, supra note 100, at 434–35 (discussing recognition of state laws in relation to same-
sex marriage); Jane E. Larson, “A House Divided”: Using Dred Scott to Teach Conflict of Laws, 27 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 577, 578–79 (1996) (outlining choice of law treatments of slavery as a human status). 
 103. See Grossman, supra note 100, at 436, 454–55 (discussing the application of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause to same-sex marriage recognition uniformly across state lines). 
 104. See Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then 
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such as the Restatement (First) rules, more modern choice of law 
rules, and myriad other laws needed to be interpreted, reinterpreted, 
challenged, and sometimes discarded as issues arose regarding the 
legitimacy and effect of unions between individuals of the same sex. 
Whenever social, political, or technological change occurs, 
existing legal rules must accommodate—sometimes dramatically. 
The same-sex marriage movement produced particularly far-reaching 
consequences because marriage has so many aspects in human 
society and individual existence. First and foremost, marriage reflects 
rules regarding partner selection. While many of those rules are 
informally defined and culturally enforced, some—such as those 
regarding age of consent to marry—are codified.105 Other aspects of 
marriage include (1) procedures for formalizing the partners’ 
commitment to the marriage106 (including licensing as well as civil 
and religious wedding rituals); (2) the economic and financial rules 
for forming a partnership, running a household, owning property, and 
rearing children; and (3) the principles and procedures governing 
dissolution107 (including dissolution either by reason of death and 
volition). Because the United States’ family law system treats 
marriage as a legal status, rather than a contractual relationship, 
partners do not have the prerogative to enunciate all of their own 
rules governing their marriage.108 Rather, they must accept rules 
prescribed by law and culture. Indeed, their decision to “marry” 
includes a decision to be bound by preexisting rules, which 
accompanies a request that the government grant imprimatur on the 
marriage union. 
The mosaic of laws governing same-sex unions in the United 
States created a rat’s nest of chaos and confusion. Adding to the 
uncertainty, state laws became a moving target, frequently changing 
                                                                                                                 
and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (2009) (citing June 1969 as the “birth of the modern gay rights 
movement”). 
 105. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 19-3-2 (2010). 
 106. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 19-3-30 (2010). 
 107. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 19-5-1 (2010). 
 108. See Nora Flum, Constituting Status: An Analysis of the Operation of Status in Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 33 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 58, 80 (2011) (“Marriage is constituted as a status, not 
contractual, relationship, and it is this legal status that gives it social status (rank).”). 
32
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss2/1
2015] CONFLICT OF LAWS STRUCTURE AND VISION 263 
as American society struggled toward equilibrium on the issue. 
Moreover, as the lives of transgendered individuals have become 
visible, additional issues have arisen as laws wrestled with issues 
raised by gender transitions, gender reassignment surgery, and 
ambiguous gender. 
Conflict of Laws issues arise from all these aspects of marriage. 
Many legal issues, including property ownership, rights to spousal 
benefits, and inheritance, turn on the question of whether a marriage 
is valid. This question often presents courts with the task of deciding 
which set of state law rules governing validity should prevail. If, after 
evaluating competing laws, a court determines that the governing law 
validates the marriage, then the court next must determine how that 
status affects the particular matter in dispute. (So, for example, a 
determination that two individuals are married can result in the 
court’s awarding inheritance rights to a putative spouse rather than a 
child of the deceased.) Overlaid on the choice of law issue on 
marriage validity is the question of marriage recognition. Even 
though a jurisdiction may not deem a marriage valid under its own 
laws, the jurisdiction may choose nonetheless to recognize another 
jurisdiction’s view that the parties are married. Why would a 
jurisdiction extend such recognition? Several important motivations 
could be at work: deference to a sister state, understanding of the 
need for uniformity of legal regulation, or respect for the individual 
rights of parties who are claiming the status of spouses. 
But of course state choice of law principles are not the end of the 
story. Fundamental individual rights, protected by the United States 
Constitution, also have a crucial role to play in Conflict of Laws. 
Privacy, consensual sexual relations, and marriage are all 
components of human life and society, which the Constitution 
protects.109 Same-sex marriage not only presents important issues 
relating to accommodating difference in state laws, but also presents 
a compelling case study of federal supervision of state laws. Enter the 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 1681, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 
(1965) (“The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 532, 29 L.Ed. 746, as protection against all governmental invasions ‘of the sanctity of 
a man’s home and the privacies of life.’”). 
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concept of federal supremacy. As of now, the United States Supreme 
Court has tread carefully, but the Court’s decision in United States v. 
Windsor suggested that the Court is willing to grapple with the issue 
head on, and that Court has now provided itself with an opportunity 
to do so very soon.110 And finally is the umpiring function of the 
federal government as reflected in the Full Faith and Credit Clause of 
the Constitution’s Article IV. This provision does not address directly 
the rights of the individuals, who wish to enjoy the status of being 
married, but instead regulates the structure of government. 
Stipulating the deference due from one state to the legal prerogatives 
of another state, the Full Faith and Credit Clause thus directly 
regulates the circumstances under which one state must recognize a 
marriage celebrated and solemnized in another state.111 While well 
studied by scholars in and out of the same-sex marriage context,112 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause is an important component of 
understanding the federalism dynamics intrinsic in domestic Conflict 
of Laws issues. 
                                                                                                                 
 110. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Specifically, the Windsor Court ruled that the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act’s restriction violated individual rights of those married under state law recognizing same-
sex marriage: 
The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect 
to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in 
personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this protection and treating those persons 
as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
Id. at 2696. 
On January 16, 2015, the Court consolidated four same-sex marriage cases and granted a writ of 
certiorari in these cases limited to the following questions: 
1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two 
people of the same sex? 2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a 
marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed 
and performed out-of-state? 
Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, 2015 WL 213646, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015); Tanco v. Haslam, No. 
14-562, 2015 WL 213648, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015); Bourke v. Beshear, No. 14-574, 2015 WL 
213651, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015). 
 111. See generally Grossman, supra note 100. 
 112. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 
620 (1954) (describing obligation of one court to enforce land decrees entered by another court); 
Grossman, supra note 100 (evaluating relevance of Full Faith and Credit Clause to marriage 
recognition); Sterk, supra note 94 (evaluating Full Faith and Credit principles in the context of workers’ 
compensation decrees). 
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B.   Loci and Modes of Regulation: Laboratories of Experiment 
Same-sex marriage provides an informative view on the diversity 
of normative judgments about state law matters informing a Conflict 
of Laws thinker’s understanding of federalism. Same-sex marriage, 
of course, is just one example of a topic for which U.S. laws 
represent diverse viewpoints. Other varying policies and goals 
reflected within state law range from tort, contract, and property to 
probate and procedure.113 On a more macro level, academics, judges, 
regulators, and students also stand to learn a tremendous amount 
about styles and modes of regulation. Indeed, one of the most salient 
qualities of the federalist system is the diverse styles and approaches 
states embrace in regulating a social problem. The approaches can 
vary in how states choose to allocate authority between state and 
local governments.114 States might also diverge in how they interpret 
the scope of federal law in a particular area. Additionally, upon 
recognizing the need for law to protect against a particular social 
harm, different jurisdictions shape regulatory policy in different 
ways. For example, states may choose administrative law, civil law, 
or criminal law mechanisms to address a particular problem—or a 
combination of all three.115 Differences in approach to procedural or 
remedial mechanisms, such as class action apparatus, can create 
significant choice of law issues as well.116 
Public health scholarship reflects a robust understanding of how 
state regulations often vary according to whether they take an 
interventional approach or a less direct route to curing a problem 
through such methods as tax incentives or infrastructure changes.117 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text for discussion of the opportunity to evaluate 
regulatory goals. 
 114. See infra note 122 for a discussion of the difference between Pennsylvania and New York in 
regulating hydraulic fracturing in the Marcellus Shale. 
 115. For an example of how a state’s decision to regulate using the criminal law, but not the civil law, 
can influence choice of law analysis, see Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976). 
 116. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (resolving 
dispute over differences between New York and federal class action rules). 
 117. James Macinko & Diana Silver, Improving State Health Policy Assessment: An Agenda for 
Measurement and Analysis, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 1697, 1697 (Sept. 2012) (contrasting direct 
interventional regulation with regulation that focuses on incidental laws and laws that affect 
infrastructure). For further illustrations of the divergent approaches that states take to public health 
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Likewise, public health scholars have also observed a pattern 
whereby some states comprehensively legislate to regulate a 
particular problem, while others take a more incremental approach.118 
One might imagine, for example, myriad Conflict of Laws problems 
pertaining to sports-related, traumatic brain injury. Questions might 
include: who bears liability for the brain injury, whether a “clearance 
to play sports” decision was reasonably given in a particular 
circumstance, and whether institutional policies and training are 
adequate.119 
A different, although equally informative, illustration of federalism 
dynamics emerges from the controversy over regulating hydraulic 
fracturing in the Marcellus Shale by Pennsylvania and New York.120 
In terms of regulatory conflict, the controversy implicates the 
regulatory power of no less than three states, the federal government, 
and a trans-jurisdictional regulatory entity.121 This type of hybrid 
                                                                                                                 
regulation, see www.lawatlas.org (providing a policy surveillance portal for public health regulation). 
This contrast in regulatory approach is also reflected in divergent approaches to regulating hydraulic 
fracturing in the Marcellus Shale by Pennsylvania and New York. See infra note 122 for further 
discussion of hydraulic fracturing in the Marcellus Shale. 
 118. Macinko & Silver, supra note 117, at 1698 (discussing differences in comprehensiveness in state 
regulation of such problems as automobile crashes, tobacco use, and alcohol addiction). 
 119. Hosea H. Harvey, Reducing Brain Injuries in Youth Sports: Youth Sports Traumatic Brain Injury 
State Laws, January 2009–December 2012, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1249 (July 2013) (surveying 
dramatic variations on state regulatory response to youth traumatic brain injuries). See also Hosea H. 
Harvey, Refereeing the Public Health, 14 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 66 (2014). 
 120. See infra note 122. 
 121. See Ross H. Pifer, What a Short, Strange Trip It’s Been: Moving Forward After Five Years of 
Marcellus Shale Development, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 615, 616 (2011); Lynn Kerr McKay et al., Science 
and the Reasonable Development of Marcellus Shale Natural Gas Resources in Pennsylvania and New 
York, 32 ENERGY L.J. 125, 126 (2011). The story of hydraulic fracturing in the Marcellus Shale is long 
and tortuous. Here is a short version, made possible by the excellent research assistance and drafting of 
Bradley Smith (Temple Law School Class of 2015): In 2008, state and local governments in 
Pennsylvania and New York were forced to confront the regulation of the natural gas industry after an 
improvement in drilling technology offered the opportunity to tap into natural gas deposits in the 
Marcellus Shale. Pifer, supra at 627–32. Both states sought policies that would allow for economic 
growth while protecting the environment; however, the respective approaches that New York and 
Pennsylvania took varied greatly. McKay, supra at 126. Pennsylvania pursued what may be viewed as 
an incremental or reactionary approach: as certain issues arose, Pennsylvania enacted solutions tailored 
specifically to the problems caused by increased natural gas drilling. Pifer, supra at 658. At first, 
Pennsylvania’s most prominent changes were increased supervision of the industry through more 
inspectors and clarifying regulations. McKay, supra at 132–33. In 2012, Pennsylvania adopted a plan 
enabling individual counties to choose to levy a designated impact fee on natural gas extraction, rather 
than implement a state-wide severance tax as is used in other natural gas drilling states. Kris Maher, 
Impact Fees Fracture Pennsylvania, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/
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regulation is common in the present era, and surely deserves a place 
in contemporary thinking about Conflict of Laws.122 
C.   Forum Shopping Springs from Diversity 
Federalism’s diversity in regulatory style and procedure creates an 
unintended consequence: the incentive to forum shop. While forum 
shopping is routinely regarded as a blight on procedural systems, the 
truth is that the Conflict of Laws discipline tacitly teaches lawyers 
how to forum shop and encourages them to do so. Those mastering 
Conflicts doctrines become keen to the strategic advantages of 
evaluating substantive and procedural differences among 
jurisdictions. Such is the reality of many types of “lawyers’ law”: 
insiders who understand law’s complicated underbelly also know 
how to exploit it. An ethical response is to sensitize lawyers to the 
inequities caused by diversity among jurisdictions, which are 
reinforced and enhanced by forum shopping practices. In short, 
forum shopping behaviors deserve thought and attention. While 
Conflict of Laws scholars have extensively studied various aspects of 
forum shopping within the last few years,123 more general research 
                                                                                                                 
articles/SB10001424127887323551004578438982990838720?mg=reno64-wsj. 
  By contrast, New York chose to regulate through an expansive moratorium on natural gas 
drilling early in the Marcellus Shale boom. McKay, supra at 128. In contrast to Pennsylvania, New 
York declined to enact smaller bits of legislation periodically. Id. at 127–28. New York’s Department of 
Environmental Conservation had begun to revise requirements for permitting natural gas drilling when 
the New York legislature and executive took preemptive actions to temporarily eliminate all drilling in 
the state. Id. at 128. New York has treated the Marcellus Shale controversy as a uniquely state issue, 
concluding that the state can dictate to cities and towns what they may do. Peter J. Kiernan, An Analysis 
of Hydrofracturing Gubernatorial Decision Making, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 769, 781–82 (2012). 
Whereas Pennsylvania enacted narrow legislation and deferred to localities for some matters, New York 
took broad action at the state level. 
  This topic also presents interesting implications for the scope of federal governance. On one 
hand, not readily apparent, controlling federal authority exists because the National Safe Drinking Water 
Act excludes hydraulic fracturing (a matter of ongoing debate). Pifer, supra at 644. Nonetheless, eastern 
Pennsylvania and a small part of New York are regulated by the Delaware River Basin Commission, a 
regional commission established by the governors of Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, 
and the federal government. Id. at 642 n.179. The Delaware River Basin Commission has imposed a de 
facto moratorium on drilling in the area it regulates, which affects Pennsylvania much more than it does 
New York. See McKay, supra at 131–32. Therefore, Pennsylvania currently submits itself to federal 
control more than New York does. 
 122. See, e.g., McKay, supra note 121; Pifer, supra note 121. 
 123. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Real Risk of Forum Shopping: A Dissent from Shady Grove, 
44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 32 (2010) (using venue transfer as an example of procedural mechanisms 
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would benefit world procedural systems. Moreover, the topic could 
have a greater role to play in Conflict of Laws courses and other 
thinkers—such as legislators, practicing lawyers, and judges—are 
well advised to consider its prevalence and consequences. 
From a legal practice perspective, Conflict of Laws cases have a 
dominant message: the forum where a lawsuit is filed enormously 
influences which party ultimately succeeds.124 A particular forum can 
provide practical, logistical, and procedural advantages for one 
litigant and potentially serious disadvantages for others. Simple 
matters as familiarity with layout of a courthouse building, knowing 
where to get documents duplicated, and enjoying the comfort of 
sleeping in one’s own bed during a protracted trial can impact 
litigation success. Likewise, forum courts tend to favor applying their 
own law governing the rights of the parties to a lawsuit.125 This 
choice of law influence on litigation’s bottom line can be huge. 
As the litigants who file the papers initiating suit, plaintiffs exert 
considerable control over where a lawsuit is filed.126 The 
consequences of forum choice give plaintiffs an incentive to shop far 
and wide for the place that delivers the optimum balance among 
convenience, reduced legal barriers to litigation, favorable 
substantive legal regulation, and helpful court procedures. One might 
justify the prerogative of forum choice as an appropriate trade-off for 
the burden that plaintiffs must generally bear in proving the elements 
of their case. That does not, however, dismiss further consideration 
of the consequences of forum choice. 
                                                                                                                 
that work with Erie to expand opportunities for forum shopping); Cassandra Burke Robertson, 
Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1116–17 (2010) (discussing 
reaction of other countries to what may be viewed as the U.S. courts’ aggressive use of forum 
manipulation tools such as forum non conveniens); Alan O. Sykes, Transnational Forum Shopping as a 
Trade and Investment Issue, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (2008) (analyzing how differences among 
adjudicatory results in different jurisdictions can distort trade and investment behavior); Christopher A. 
Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011) (presenting findings 
on forum shopping trends). 
 124. Whytock, supra note 123, at 498. 
 125. Id. at 493. 
 126. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 123. 
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Plaintiffs encounter at least one formidable check on their ability 
to file in an optimum forum: personal jurisdiction restrictions.127 
Competently represented defendants are unlikely to waive personal 
jurisdiction challenges, and courts tend to take seriously the 
constitutional minimums required for asserting personal jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, in today’s mobile and globally integrated world, 
defendants often have contacts that provide a constitutionally 
sufficient basis to support personal jurisdiction in several 
jurisdictions. Together with a lawyer’s increased ability to litigate 
outside her home jurisdiction, this increased ability to maneuver 
around personal jurisdiction limitations makes forum shopping a 
reality now more than ever.128 
Forum shopping may involve a number of alternatives: the choice 
between United States courts and courts of foreign countries, the 
choice among courts of foreign countries, the choice between federal 
courts in the United States and state courts in the United States, and 
the choice among different state courts in the United States. 
Phenomena such as libel tourism129 outside the United States and the 
status of the United States as a magnet forum130 for many types of 
litigation provide important case studies on the interaction of world 
procedural systems and inequities in standards of justice. Yet focus 
on domestic, U.S. forum shopping alone discloses important lessons. 
Not only do the details of forum shopping give realism and 
currency to Conflict of Laws issues, but these details are important to 
understanding of the consequences of routine law practice and a large 
range of matters pertinent to regulatory reform. An informed decision 
about what, if any, preventative action to take against forum 
shopping requires appreciation of the forces that create the practice as 
                                                                                                                 
 127. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 110–11 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 8th ed. 2012). 
 128. Whytock, supra note 123, at 492–93. 
 129. For analysis of the incentive for libel plaintiffs to file suit outside the United States, see generally 
Laura E. Little, Internet Defamation, Freedom of Expression, and the Lessons of Private International 
Law for the United States, 14 EUR. Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 181 (2012) (surveying libel tourism 
developments and the reaction of the United States); Daniel C. Taylor, Libel Tourism: Protecting 
Authors and Preserving Comity, 99 GEO. L.J. 189 (2010) (focusing on free speech ramifications of libel 
tourism). 
 130. See generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 294–95 (6th 
ed. 2010) (using “magnet forum” to describe foreign plaintiffs’ attraction to U.S. courts). 
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well as the reasons why it is generally condemned. Some contexts for 
forum shopping present easy judgments: consider, for example, a 
party’s decision to litigate in a particular jurisdiction to benefit from 
the jurisdiction’s widespread corruption. Certainly this is not a forum 
shopping practice deserving of respect. In most cases, however, the 
causes and effects of forum shopping are more subtle and 
complicated, and the decision whether government should actively 
seek to ward off its occurrence may require fine-tuned evaluation of 
specific facts. 
For the purpose of evaluating the federalism implications of forum 
shopping, one must understand that litigant incentives and strategic 
behavior do not operate alone. Forums themselves may host (or 
encourage) forces that attract or repel litigation.131 These forces relate 
to matters such as (i) a desire to foster economic benefits in a 
particular locale or a particular population group within the locale; 
(ii) cultural characteristics reflected in court systems that prefer one 
type of litigant over another; (iii) local preferences for greater or 
lesser damages; and (iv) intended or unintended byproducts of 
regulatory schemes. Sometimes these forces combine to empower 
particular jurisdictions to lure court filings for a disproportionate 
percentage of cases in a particular category. 
1.   Choices Among Federal Courts 
Within the United States, a variety of forums attract specific cases 
and litigants. Take the unlikely example of a small Texas town, 
Marshall, Texas, with an impressive record for attracting patent 
litigation: in 2005, its United States District Court entertained more 
patent lawsuits than federal district courts in San Francisco, Chicago, 
New York City, and Washington.132 What’s the draw of Marshall, 
Texas? The answer seems to be a rocket docket combined with 
plaintiff-friendly verdicts.133 What’s the apparent benefit for the 
town? Increased real estate investment and greater business for hotels 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Whytock, supra note 123, at 498. 
 132. Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, § 3, at 1. 
 133. Id. at 9. 
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and restaurants.134 Marshall, Texas, is not alone. In a wholly different 
context, analysts have also pointed out a possible economic incentive 
at work as jurisdictions considered whether to recognize same-sex 
marriage.135 This would seem particularly true of jurisdictions with 
an established tourism infrastructure, which would benefit from out-
of-state citizens, traveling to marry and then honeymoon in the same-
sex marriage jurisdiction.136 
Disclosing similar findings, scholars have identified powerful 
forces within the federal system that render specific judicial districts 
more attractive to bankruptcy filings than other districts.137 Indeed, 
this bankruptcy venue issue has proven a lightning rod for 
controversy—well known to bankruptcy scholars and practitioners—
but has not been widely linked with larger policy issues of forum 
shopping and Conflict of Laws.138 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Id. at 8. Another notable example of a forum known for plaintiff-friendly verdicts is Texarkana, 
Texas, which provides unique opportunities for forum shopping within the same locale. DISCOVER OUR 
TOWN, http://www.discoverourtown.com/AR/Texarkana/Attractions/172184.html (last visited October 
27, 2014) (explaining that Texarkana is home to “[t]he only federal building in the country sited in two 
states and the only federal courthouse located in two circuits, the 5th and the 8th, and two districts, the 
Eastern District of Texas and the Western District of Arkansas”). 
 135. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize 
Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 780–86 (1995) (analyzing economic incentives for states to 
recognize same-sex marriage). 
 136. Id. at 769–72. 
 137. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: Is Corporate 
Reorganization Failing?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 401, 402 (2006) (reporting on observations that “[a] high 
repeat filing rate first afflicted two ‘magnet’ venues, the District of Delaware and the Southern District 
of New York, then spread nationwide as other judges have tried to attract cases to their own courts”). 
 138. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING 
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 137 (2005). In writings inspiring considerable controversy, Professor Lynn 
LoPucki has argued that United States bankruptcy courts compete fiercely with each other, resulting in a 
dramatic chain of consequences stemming from forum shopping: 
[C]ourt competition is an active, deliberate response by the court to forum shopping. 
When courts compete, they change what they are doing to make themselves more 
attractive to forum shoppers. . . . The court that offers forum shoppers the most may be 
the only one that gets cases in the end, but all of the judges who compete are corrupted 
along way. 
Id. 
  Why do judges compete so aggressively for bankruptcy cases? LoPucki cites judicial desire for 
prestige, professional satisfaction, and self-preservation. Lynn M. LoPucki, Response, Where Do You 
Get Off? A Reply to Courting Failure’s Critics, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 511, 512 (2006) (reviewing arguments 
about why bankruptcy judges are under pressure and how they respond to the pressure). According to 
LoPucki, judges wish to appease powerful members of the bankruptcy bar and the business 
community—who act as “case placers”—so that the judges can attract big, interesting cases to their 
venues. Id. at 513. Moreover, since bankruptcy judges are not appointed for life, they depend for their 
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2.   Choices Among State Courts 
Forum differences and resulting forum shopping are not confined 
to federal courts. Indeed, the differences are equally pronounced for 
litigants choosing among state courts.139 Not only are some states 
more attractive to plaintiffs (and less attractive to defendants) than 
others, but specific locations—counties, cities, and towns—can 
garner nationwide reputations among litigants. For example, the 
United States Chamber of Commerce periodically evaluates state 
liability systems, scrutinizing factors such as treatment of class 
actions, punitive and other damages, timeliness, discovery and 
evidentiary policies, judges’ impartiality and competence, as well as 
jury predictability and fairness.140 Surveying attorneys’ opinions 
about these matters, the Chamber identified strong jurisdictional 
preferences, including fine-tuned preferences that distinguished 
among different counties and cities within states.141 In addition, states 
also develop reputations for expertise in specific subject matters, 
whether they be corporate law (Delaware), entertainment matters 
(New York and California), insurance law (Connecticut), or another 
subject.142 
                                                                                                                 
reappointment on the support of the local bankruptcy bar, particularly powerful members of the bar, 
who influence where cases are filed and benefit from practicing in a forum with robust bankruptcy 
activity. Id. LoPucki argues that the judges compete for more bankruptcy business by making rulings 
that affect professional fees, trustee appointments, conflicts of interests, and taxes—matters that are 
sufficiently important to the business community and bankruptcy bar to influence where bankruptcy 
petitions are filed. Id. at 514–15. 
  It should be noted that many of LoPucki’s claims are contested by other bankruptcy scholars. 
See, e.g., William C. Whitford, Venue Choice: Where the Action Is, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 321, 321–22 
(2006). His observations, however, raise important concerns about how self-interest and power can be 
tied to the ability of litigants to forum shop. 
 139. Hay, supra note 36, at 620. 
 140. Humphrey Taylor, 2007 U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems Ranking Study, 
2007 U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 6–8. 
 141. Id. at 18. The respondents ranked Delaware, Nebraska, and New Hampshire as “best” in their 
treatment of tort and contract litigation and West Virginia, Louisiana, and Mississippi as “worst.” Id. at 
21. In addition, they zeroed in on Los Angeles, California, and Chicago/Cook County, Illinois, as the 
cities and counties with the least fair and reasonable litigation environment. Id. at 18. 
 142. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 661, 698 (2008) (Delaware); CONN. INS. L.J., http://insurancejournal.org/?page_id=17 (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2014) (Connecticut); Kirk T. Schroder, Entertainment Law: Some Practice 
Considerations for Beginners, 13 ENT. & SPORTS L. 8, 9 (1996) (California & New York). 
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Aside from explicit differences in procedural and substantive laws, 
states can also be more or less attractive to litigants because of non-
law related factors such as infrastructure. Consider, for example, 
instances where a jurisdiction might offer a substantive legal 
advantage for high stakes trials, but, for various reasons, does not 
provide the “brick and mortar” comforts that usually accompany such 
events. In one case, a Walt Disney Company shareholder trial in 
downstate (Georgetown) Delaware required big city lawyers to create 
temporary offices in old houses and beach hotels, a task that included 
paying to upgrade electrical systems to accommodate the high-tech 
photocopiers and other equipment.143 Presumably Georgetown, 
Delaware, presented a dilemma for the lawyers: judicial subject 
matter expertise, infrastructure support, and attorney comfort all hung 
in the balance.144 
3.   Choices Between State and Federal Courts 
And of course there are classic forum shopping issues raised by 
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction in federal courts and the Erie 
doctrine.145 While this is perhaps the most well-known and well-
studied example of forum choice, several subtle—yet potentially 
important—issues usually escape attention. Of particular note for the 
Conflict of Laws theorist are the consequences of the rule that a 
federal district court must apply the choice of laws rules of the forum 
state to resolve state law conflicts.146 Could this rule actually 
exacerbate forum shopping by allowing federal procedural 
mechanisms to expand a litigant’s possibilities for benefitting from 
favorable state laws?147 At least one scholar has pointed out that Erie 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Maureen Milford, Big-City Lawyers on the Road Scrape for Office Space, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 
2004, at C6. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Borchers, supra note 123, at 30. 
 146. Id. at 30. 
 147. Id. at 32 (using venue transfer as an example of procedural mechanisms that work with Erie to 
expand opportunities for forum shopping); see also Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and 
Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129, 139–40 (2011) (noting that for 
class litigation, Erie and differences among state choice of law doctrines increase forum shopping 
incentives). 
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may have actually increased horizontal forum shopping148 by 
eliminating a uniform “general law” that prevailed under Swift v. 
Tyson.149 A related subtlety concerns how differences in state and 
federal stare decisis policies can encourage forum shopping.150 Some 
suggest that differences in how federal and state courts view state 
court precedent can make federal courts more attractive than state 
courts, where a litigant seeks to benefit from likely, but not yet 
formalized, legal changes.151 
Yet a final, related, and frequently overlooked forum shopping 
phenomenon concerns the obligation of state courts to apply federal 
law, which is sometimes called the “reverse-Erie” problem.152 While 
definitions of the reverse-Erie issue vary, one helpful approach 
confines the reverse-Erie doctrine to matters bearing on the conduct 
of litigation, embracing the view that the doctrine simply requires 
state courts to apply federal practices that are closely interwoven with 
“the relevant federal claim, despite the existence of conflicting state 
procedures.”153 Under reverse-Erie, a lawyer’s forum shopping 
opportunities may be expanded, since the lawyer can use a state 
system while benefitting from federal practice rules, even though the 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Sherry, supra note 147, at 138–39. “Horizontal” forum shopping refers in this instance to 
choosing among federal district courts situated in different states. Id. 
 149. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). See Sherry, supra note 147, at 141 (arguing that lack of uniformity between 
state and federal court is worse under Erie than under Swift because federal courts under Swift had 
developed a body of “cohesive and coherent” general laws). 
 150. JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 218 (Aspen Publishers 
5th ed. 2006). 
 151. See, e.g., id. at 227–28 (arguing that federal district courts have more latitude in anticipating 
changes in the law than state courts, which must follow strict stare decisis policy in adhering to a 
decision of a state supreme court). 
 152. See Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 1237, 1251–61 (2011) (discussing a parallel phenomenon relating to state courts’ obligations to 
follow the law of other states and pointing out that states often do not follow this obligation faithfully 
and instead indulge the dubious assumption that a foreign state’s law is the same as forum law). 
Professor Green’s observations raise the specter of even greater incentives for forum shopping among 
state courts. Id. 
 153. Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied Challenges 
under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181, 1232 (2011). Other definitions of the 
reverse-Erie doctrine are broader, encompassing the mandate that “federal law—be it constitutional, 
statutory, or common law—will apply pursuant to the Supremacy Clause in state court, subject to the 
Constitution or Congress having already chosen the applicable law, whenever it preempts state law or 
whenever it prevails by an Erie-like judicial choice of law.” Kevin Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 44 (2006). 
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federal court system would clearly be available because the suit 
arises under federal law.154 
In sum, forum shopping is a complex phenomenon, implicating 
“micro” concerns, such as hotel space and electrical capacity at real 
estate surrounding courthouses, as well as “macro” concerns such as 
judicial corruption, global economic performance, stare decisis 
policy, and the effects of cross-border transactions on the power of 
national governments.155 Forum shopping is intimately tied to 
Conflicts of Law and, as such, deserves significant attention from 
Conflicts analysts. Perhaps the myriad variables influencing litigation 
success are so complicated and interdependent as to render foolhardy 
a lawyer’s attempt to account for them all. Nonetheless, these factors 
merit close scrutiny, especially where they implicate a key part of 
litigation success—such as the opportunity to avoid highly 
unfavorable governing law by changing the applicable choice of law 
analysis, the possibility to benefit from potential changes in state law, 
or the possibility to change the identity of the fact-finder (judge or 
jury). 
III.   USING CONFLICT OF LAWS TO EXPLORE GOVERNMENT IN THE 
GLOBAL ERA 
In the United States, we conceptualize Conflict of Laws most often 
as a domestic matter. This could hardly be described as a 
misconceived travesty: with the different laws of fifty states, 
territories, local governments, and a federal government, the United 
States faces a significant challenge managing domestic conflicts. One 
also can argue that a nation’s success depends first on its ability to 
keep its own house in order. Accordingly, our nation’s primary focus 
on creating effective mechanisms for resolving internal clashes 
among domestic laws is both defensible and rational. But to ignore 
the relationship among the laws of various nations forgoes an 
                                                                                                                 
 154. See Clermont supra note 153, at 44. 
 155. See, e.g., Fleur Johns, Performing Party Autonomy, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (2008) 
(discussing these macro concerns in the context of contractual choice of forum and choice of law 
clauses). 
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important opportunity to understand sovereign power struggles as 
well as cultural differences among the world’s people. Moreover, the 
transnational forces that influence litigation behavior of international 
actors reveal important insights into the variety of national 
procedural systems. Understanding these transnational forces not 
only educates U.S. thinkers about practices in the rest of the world, 
but also provides insights into the nature of the U.S. system. Finally, 
situating Conflict of Laws within an international frame brings out 
puzzling, yet fundamental, questions about the relationship among 
Conflict of Laws and other forms of international law as well as the 
nature of sovereignty itself. 
A.   Transnational Conflicts: Globalism in a Traditional Context 
By design, Conflict of Laws envisions competing governmental 
systems. To concentrate solely on domestic regulatory competition 
suggests a parochialism that is out of step with contemporary 
individual, government, and business behavior. One need only 
consider the magnitude of internet activity conducted across borders 
to appreciate the importance of understanding transnational Conflicts 
principles. In terms of pedagogy, law practice, and legal scholarship, 
confining Conflicts thinking to domestic problems sends the wrong 
message about the relationship of the United States with the rest of 
the world.156 
Lawyerly and scholarly focus on legal conflicts among different 
nations provides an opportunity to appreciate varying modes and 
styles of regulation. The result may be a better understanding of the 
various incentives and goals of various laws. With this 
understanding, more harmonious relationships—commercial or 
otherwise—may develop. A focus on other countries’ laws may also 
educate judges, lawyers, and academics in the U.S. about aspects of 
                                                                                                                 
 156. For a discussion of the importance of raising globalism topics in the classroom, see generally 
Carole Silver, Getting Real About Globalization and Legal Education: Potential and Perspectives for 
the U.S., 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 457 (2013); Catherine Valcke, Global Law Teaching, 54 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 160 (2004). 
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alternative systems that lawmakers might favorably borrow or imitate 
for improving domestic U.S. regulation. 
The topics through which Conflicts thinkers might study 
transnational differences are vast. As an example, I begin with one 
topic particularly important to legal professionals: the (frequently 
overlooked) Conflict of Laws issues pertaining to regulating lawyers 
engaged in transnational law practice. Not only does this topic relate 
to important professional responsibility concerns arising from 
multijurisdictional practice, but it also brings to light the variety of 
modes of lawyer regulation throughout the world. Might the United 
States learn from focusing on these differences? As legal practice 
globalizes and the market for U.S. legal services continues to suffer, 
should we consider following the trend toward deregulation of 
lawyers embraced in the United Kingdom? Alternatively, might we 
consider a national uniform regulation of lawyers—as is evidenced in 
many legal systems around world—or a licensing approach similar to 
the U.S. scheme for driver’s licenses—as evidenced by the lawyer 
licensing scheme used in Canada.157 At the very least, focus on this 
variety in regulation might educate U.S. lawmakers about the current 
insularity of U.S. lawyer regulation and the competitive advantages 
enjoyed by foreign lawyers operating under more liberal licensing 
schemes. 
Appreciating the variety of lawyer licensing schemes may have 
important professional and economic consequences for United States 
lawyers. In the context of litigation, however, those issues tend to 
provide a sideshow distraction, rather than the “main event” for 
controversy. Transnational issues also repeatedly pop up in the core 
of legal disputes. Although courts sometimes explicitly consider 
these transnational conflicts using standard choice of law analysis,158 
that choice of law analysis is frequently lacking. A particularly 
                                                                                                                 
 157. RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE 5–10 
(2013) (describing various countries’ approaches to lawyer regulation and the liberalization of 
regulations in England and Wales). 
 158. See, e.g., Dominican Republic v. AES Corp., 466 F. Supp. 2d 680, 693 (E.D. Va. 2006) (using 
the First Restatement approach to consider whether Virginia, Florida, Puerto Rican, or Dominican law 
governs a tort claim). 
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salient example of ignoring choice of law analysis comes from cases 
in which U.S. courts consider the unilateral (self-focused) question of 
whether a U.S. regulatory scheme applies to a case with transnational 
elements—cases presenting so-called questions of extraterritorial 
application of United States law. 
In a series of opinions, the United States Supreme Court has 
developed a set of principles for extraterritorial application cases, 
laying out concepts governing when federal law should apply to 
entities and conduct outside the territorial limits of the United 
States.159 While these cases present essentially the same problem as a 
typical multilateral Conflict of Laws case with domestic and foreign 
elements, the opinions barely hint at this overlap.160 Instead, they 
speak from a hegemonic or empire model: unilaterally asking 
whether the United States wants to—and can get away with—
applying its law to the dispute.161 Even if one were to reject any 
notion that the United States “owes” other sovereigns careful 
consideration of conflicting regulations using traditional Conflict of 
Laws doctrines, one might surely accept that Conflicts doctrines 
might enhance the quality of justice extended to litigants in 
individual cases. 
Choice of law analysis involving foreign country laws does more 
than instruct on alternatives to domestic law. As argued by several 
scholars, choice of law analysis can assist in appreciating the cultural 
implications inherent in legal and political clashes, perhaps setting 
the stage for greater acceptance—or peaceful co-existence.162 This is 
                                                                                                                 
 159. E.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (evaluating the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (evaluating the 
Sherman Act); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (evaluating Title VII). 
 160. See cases cited supra note 159. Instead, the opinions mention standards for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, including concerns with the location of conduct, participant nationality, domestic effects, 
and comity. While these are concepts closely related to Conflict of Laws, the Court has neither 
recognized nor capitalized on the connection. See cases cited supra note 140. 
 161. See, e.g., Morrison, 561 U.S. 247 at 250–51 (deciding that statutory language and indications of 
statutory intent were not sufficient to justify regulating foreign activities); Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 
U.S. at 769–70 (relying on principles of “international comity” to justify regulating foreign conduct). 
 162. Annelise Riles, Cultural Conflicts, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 273–75 (2008). Riles 
suggests that Conflict of Laws confronts human problems that extend beyond analytical puzzles 
pertaining to political power, sources of formal authority, and individual rights. Id. at 274–77. Pointing 
out that Conflicts grapples with cultural clashes, she observes that a forum court confronting a Conflicts 
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a point important for domestic relations cases, which often implicate 
sensitive cultural and moral issues that may or may not be unique to 
the societies in which they arose.163 And, of course, looming large is 
the well-documented, yet still evolving, context of internet 
regulation—a context in which the appropriate form of Conflict of 
Laws doctrines is still a matter of debate.164 
                                                                                                                 
case must evaluate and understand a foreign value system, a value system responsible for a legal rule in 
variance with domestic law. Id. at 274–75. Riles notes that cultural value clashes appear in “seemingly 
exotic disputes,” such as fights about enforcing “agreements stemming from Islamic banking practices,” 
as well as in more “mundane” state tort litigation. Id. at 275. Riles observes that cultural conflicts are 
generally “submerged” in standard choice of law doctrine. Id. 
 163. See generally Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, From Multiculturalism to 
Technique: Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REV. 589 (2012) (exploring 
the usefulness of Conflicts doctrine in the domestic relations context); Reynolds, supra note 6 (outlining 
the pedagogical benefits of teaching international family law in a general Conflict of Laws course). 
  Of particular interest is the question of how the formal structure of Conflicts doctrine 
(particularly as manifest in judgments law) interacts with the cultural, moral, and emotional issues 
triggered by family law. Does the formal structure of Conflicts doctrine in this area provide a good 
vehicle for harnessing the challenges of domestic relations law? Does it empower courts to handle 
questions of culture clash with detachment and precision? Alternatively, is there a bad fit between 
conflicts and domestic relations law: with conflicts doctrine obscuring the “real battle” in the cases, 
confusing the issues, or creating a smoke screen for subterfuge? 
 164. The literature on this important and difficult subject is appropriately wide-ranging and extensive. 
Although I believe it merits further extensive study, many scholars, regulators, and practitioners 
appreciate that message. I thus do not devote space here for further discussion of the topic. One 
particularly salient debate in the literature concerns whether the internet calls for a special form of 
regulation, reduced regulation, or existing forms of regulation. For a cross-section of existing writings, 
see, for example, Damon C. Andrews & John M. Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in 
the Cloud, 73 MD. L. REV. 313 (2013) (outlining unique personal jurisdiction and choice of law concepts 
for analyzing disputes involving cloud technology); Laura E. Little, Internet Choice of Law Governance, 
China Private Int’l Law F. (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045070 (arguing that internet 
governance issues require heightened attention and consideration of specialized rules); Little, supra note 
129, at 186–87 (discussing how courts sometimes invoke standard choice of law methodology to 
internet defamation cases); Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: 
Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1823 (2005) (observing 
tendency of courts to apply local law in transnational cyberspace disputes); Andrea Slane, Tales, Techs, 
and Territories: Private International Law, Globalization, and the Legal Construction of Borderlessness 
on the Internet, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 130 (2008) (stating that “courts in Internet cases 
almost always confine conflicts issues to the exercise of . . . personal jurisdiction . . . [and] virtually 
never engage in a full conflicts analysis”); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise 
of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1376 (1996) (advocating a flexible, open ended view of 
cyberspace governance). 
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B.   Conflict of Laws and International Law: Why Entirely Separate 
Channels of Regulation? 
A related and important, yet strangely uncharted, context for 
Conflict of Laws thinking concerns the discipline’s interaction with 
international law. Both Conflict of Laws doctrines and international 
law contribute to a coordinated system of governance monitoring the 
world’s affairs, affairs that include matters as complicated and 
interrelated as nuclear energy, internet communication, human 
migration, and climate change. Yet their relation to each other is 
under-theorized. 
Both disciplines track each other in important ways. For example, 
classic international law doctrines include theories of jurisdiction 
(jurisdiction to adjudicate, jurisdiction to prescribe, and jurisdiction 
to enforce)165 that dovetail closely with the tripartite nature of 
Conflict of Laws (personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and 
judgments).166 Both Conflicts and international law regulate the same 
basic problems. How far does a court’s adjudicative power reach? 
What are the appropriate circumstances under which one 
jurisdiction’s policies should dominate another? When is it 
appropriate for a jurisdiction to impose its resolution of a dispute on 
another jurisdiction? Yet, while these two subjects could inform and 
guide each other on these issues, discussion of the overlap between 
the two is largely absent: the relationship between Conflict of Laws 
and international law remains elusive. One important task for 
Conflict of Laws thinkers therefore is to situate Conflicts doctrines 
within or alongside the broad scope of international law. Both 
disciplines would stand to benefit from the effort. 
One explanation for the silence about the relationship between 
Conflicts and international law may be that international law tends to 
escape precise definition. This results perhaps because international 
law is vast, comprising at least three sets of principles and rules: 
                                                                                                                 
 165. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987) 
(describing these three categories of jurisdiction). 
 166. See generally EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (West 4th ed. 2004) (explaining 
the three components of Conflicts: personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgments). 
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(1) those that operate among nations;167 (2) those that govern entities 
interacting across national borders; and (3) those that sometimes 
govern relationships that exist between a nation and entities within its 
borders. Conflict of Laws is narrower.168 In fact, when Conflict of 
Laws doctrines regulate interactions among different nation states, 
the subject is usually regarded as a subset of international law.169 
We generally regard the term “private international law” as a 
synonym for Conflict of Laws doctrines operating in a transnational 
setting. The reference to “private” in “private international law” 
evokes the distinction between public and private spheres of 
international law,170 which is now thought inaccurate and outmoded 
by many scholars.171 The distinction still remains in current use, 
however, in many places in the world. 
General international law principles are more sweeping than 
Conflict of Laws doctrines in other ways. Conflict of Laws doctrines 
generally presume that some domestic law principle should provide 
the central source of authority for dispute resolution.172 The task of 
Conflicts principles then is to identify which domestic authority 
should prevail where various domestic rules irreconcilably clash. 
International law sometimes takes this task as its mission. But 
international law also has greater aspirations, such as identifying 
universal norms of human governance and establishing supranational 
                                                                                                                 
 167. International law thinkers often use the more general term “states,” rather than “nations”—
nomenclature that potentially raises confusion for those working primarily with choice of law in the 
United States. 
 168. See SCOLES, supra note 166, at 2–4. 
 169. See Craig Scott, “Transnational Law” as Proto-Concept: Three Conceptions, 10 GER. L.J. 859, 
869 n.16 (2009) (noting Conflicts doctrines take on the label “private international law,” where they 
operate across national borders). Within a federalist system, the relationship among the component 
sovereigns—e.g., “states” in the United States, “provinces” in Canada—is regulated by domestic 
Conflict of Laws principles that do not usually have much “international” about them. Id. 
 170. Id. For an articulation of the distinction between private and public international law, see MARK 
WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (Aspen 5th ed. 2008) (explaining that public international law 
“mostly concerns the political interactions of states” and private international law relates to “conflicts 
and cooperation among national legal systems”). 
 171. Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1040 
(2011) (stating that a private international law approach is “outdated”). 
 172. See JANIS, supra note 170, at 5. Sometimes domestic law may point to international law as the 
source of authority, although this occurs less in the United States than in the European Union and 
elsewhere. Id. at 4. 
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institutions. In some instances, these institutions and norms are 
designed to operate alongside the laws of nation states to have a 
vertical relationship with them. Some advocate that international law 
may have the effect of harmonizing domestic laws or creating hybrid 
principles.173 Nonetheless, the ultimate result may allow international 
law to dominate and suppress national law in the name of a superior 
international norm—and not—as in the usual Conflict of Laws 
context—in the name of peaceful horizontal relationships among 
nation states. 
As discussed above, Conflict of Laws principles are most often 
creatures of common law. By contrast, international law has a variety 
of sources. One view confines international law to principles 
identified by consent among sovereigns, memorialized in treaties or 
other formal instruments.174 Most, however, agree that custom also 
gives rise to international legal principles.175 The absence of 
principles such as universal norms and custom in Conflict of Laws 
analysis may be an important contrast, calling for further thought. 
Within the United States, state law is the major source of Conflict 
of Laws doctrines, even where a choice of law dispute involves the 
law of a foreign nation.176 United States constitutional principles 
embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Supremacy 
Clause provide some supervision of state choice of law doctrines. 
The presence of these U.S. constitutional principles highlights 
another important point about the relationship between international 
law and Conflict of Laws: circumstances exist when international law 
displaces Conflicts doctrines. The Supremacy Clause establishes that, 
where applicable, U.S. treaty provisions must direct states to resolve 
relevant Conflicts questions in a particular way.177 Accordingly, 
international law instruments can displace otherwise applicable state 
law Conflicts principles. Finally, certain types of international law 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Id. at 5 (explaining that rules of international law blend “various forms of rulemaking conduct of 
two or more states”). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 7. 
 177. See YEAZELL, supra note 127, at 64. 
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principles, known as jus cogens, preemptory, or nonderogable norms, 
act as “super law” that can override other sources of international 
law.178 Examples of jus cogens rules include prohibitions against war 
crimes, genocide, slavery, and torture.179 Where the result of a 
domestic Conflict of Laws analysis might implicate a jus cogens 
prohibition, one would expect Conflicts principles to yield to the jus 
cogens principle, which the international community would regard as 
a more fundamental tenet of human governance. 
Despite differences between Conflict of Law doctrines and 
international law, Conflicts thinkers should consider the synergy and 
benefits that international law and Conflicts offer each other. After 
all, Conflict of Laws doctrines and international law concern very 
much the same question: what is the appropriate relation among 
laws? Scholars have recognized that both Conflicts and international 
law have “rules that determine whether a case with links to more than 
one jurisdiction is governed by the law of the forum or the law of one 
of those jurisdictions.”180 We see that international law may “trump” 
Conflicts principles where those principles insufficiently protect jus 
cogens principles or clash with an international instrument such as a 
treaty. But perhaps Conflicts thinkers should consider other ways in 
which the discipline might learn from, and thus benefit from, 
international law. For example, Conflicts thinkers might consider 
whether to incorporate into Conflicts doctrines themselves a set of 
universal norms previously identified in international law that may 
serve as tie-breakers in cases of irreconcilable conflict between 
domestic laws. 
As for the benefits that Conflicts doctrine offers international law, 
domestic courts might find that Conflicts principles provide a formal, 
rigorous, and often familiar way for them to consider and respect 
international law, regarding it as true law, but without “simplifying” 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See, e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS (3d ed. 2010) (describing 
peremptory or jus cogens rules). 
 179. EDWARD M. WISE, ELLEN S. PODGOR & ROGER S. CLARK, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 58–60 (3d ed. 2009). 
 180. Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, International Law in Domestic Courts: A Conflict 
of Laws Approach, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 269, 271 (2010). 
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it “by characterizing it . . . as domestic law.”181 Scholars observe that 
Conflict of Laws brings a “wealth of experience” to inform debates 
about the role of international law in domestic courts.182 Calling the 
technical nature of Conflict of Laws doctrine “a strength” and not a 
“shortcoming,” these thinkers maintain that Conflicts provides a 
structured technique for “thinking through problems of legal, 
political and cultural relativism.”183 
We see then that although both international law and Conflict of 
Laws have much in common, the two fields don’t “talk” to each other 
enough. Here lies an opportunity for Conflict of Laws scholars and 
regulators: to initiate dialogue with international law thinkers as well 
as possible joint ventures. 
C.   Uncharted Territory: Sovereignty or Other Ways of 
Conceptualizing Governance and Identity 
Finally, I propose that Conflicts thinkers travel into relatively new, 
uncharted territory. Specifically, I see the discipline as capable of 
expanding beyond concepts of governmental sovereignty, so as to 
conceptualize alternative, potentially more effective units, through 
which humans might relate to each other. Are sovereign nations or 
states the best way to conduct group interactions? When we think of 
rights, disputes about rights, and modes to ensure preservation of 
rights, should we focus solely on governmentally constituted courts 
and potentially clashing legislative principles? Or should we 
conceive some different kind of unit for group interaction and rights 
protection? Is Conflict of Laws learning useful only for umpiring 
clashes of one sovereign government against another? Might it also 
be useful for negotiating clashes among non-state actors? 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. at 270. 
 182. Id. at 271. 
 183. Id. Other scholars are not so sanguine about how useful currently constituted conflict of law 
doctrine can be in world governance. For example, Professor Horatia Muir Watt argues the choice of 
law, personal jurisdiction, and judgment recognition doctrines within international criminal law need to 
be reconstituted to avoid manipulation by private actors and to provide meaningful global governance. 
Horatia Muir Watt, Reshaping Private International Law in a Changing World, CONFLICT OF LAWS.NET 
(April 2, 2008), http://conflictoflaws.net/2008/guest-editorial-muir-watt-on-reshaping-private- 
international-law-in-a-changing-world/. 
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Governments are proving increasingly inept at erecting electronic 
borders.184 This suggests that humans are in the process of 
developing communities—through social media or otherwise—that 
have become so expansive and powerful that they are evolving into 
autonomous entities, entities that might take on a role of “legitimate” 
norm definition. What is the role of Conflicts in this evolution? 
Conflict of Laws confines its role simply to negotiating new clashes 
among “legitimate” norms? Conflicts thinkers develop deep 
experience with identifying modes and purposes of regulation—as 
well as with evaluating and protecting procedural systems. Perhaps 
they might deploy this expertise in guiding these communities as they 
form and develop. 
A catalyst for encouraging new non-state communities (and 
enhancing their status) may come from changes in the concept of 
national citizenship. On this topic, a rich literature has developed that 
challenges traditional concepts of citizenship, asking whether 
citizenship is no longer relevant in today’s world.185 Regardless of 
whether citizenship will soon disappear as a defining concept of 
world governance, contemporary conceptions of citizenship have 
evolved, and now include diverse elements such as “status, rights, 
political engagement, and identity.”186 What will be the role of this 
broad concept as transnational communities become more robust? 
Consider contemporary clashes over citizenship, which test both 
the definition of citizenship itself as well as a population’s tolerance 
for diversity. A particularly salient example pertains to laws 
restricting burqa and niqab wearing on French territory: French 
authorities have suggested that burqa or niqab wearing may reflect a 
woman’s rejection of core French values, justifying the government 
to refuse the woman citizenship status.187 This position coincides 
                                                                                                                 
 184. See, e.g., Little, supra note 164, at 3 (explaining that “despite the internet’s increasing 
integration into modern life, the debate about internet governance has not resolved”). 
 185. See, e.g., LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY 
MEMBERSHIP (Princeton University Press 2008); PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN 
IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION (Oxford University Press 2008); Ralf Michaels, Global Legal 
Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243 (2009); Berman, supra note 164. 
 186. BOSNIAK, supra note 185, at 20. 
 187. Siobhán Mullally, Civic Integration, Migrant Women and the Veil: At the Limits of Rights?, 74 
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with national policy agendas implementing “integration testing” 
seeking to erect barriers to citizenship for immigrants.188 Might not 
the policy and systemic sensitivities that permeate choice of law 
doctrines help to navigate clashes of this type? 
As a discipline, Conflict of Laws relies heavily on the concept of 
domicile. For example, domicile triggers First Restatement vested 
rights and strong government interests under Governmental Interest 
analysis.189 Domicile is also prominently listed as an important 
connecting factor in myriad Second Restatement sections,190 and is a 
well-litigated status.191 Conflict of Laws has an extensive record for 
handling attempts to manipulate domicile as well as policy clashes on 
the topic.192 As such, the discipline possesses expansive learning to 
contribute to debates about the role of domicile, residency, and 
citizenship in contemporary life.193 This could prove enormously 
useful as the world adapts to new forms of group interactions and 
inevitable clashes that occur. 
CONCLUSION 
The genesis of Conflict of Laws is debated, with some scholars 
finding its origins in Ancient Greece and others placing its roots in 
the Middle Ages.194 However one comes down on this debate, no 
                                                                                                                 
MOD. L. REV. 27, 28–29 (2011). 
 188. Id. at 28–29. 
 189. Whytock, supra note 123, at 494. 
 190. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (listing domicile as a connecting 
factor for choice of law decisions in general tort cases); Id. at § 150 (listing domicile as a presumptive 
connecting factor for choice of law decisions in multistate defamation cases); Id. at § 188 (listing 
domicile as a connecting factor for choice of law decisions in general contract cases). 
 191. For a particularly thoughtful, well-researched decision on domicile, see Mzamane v. Winfrey, 
693 F. Supp. 2d 442 (E.D. Pa. 2010). The Mzamane case concerns a case of alleged multi-jurisdictional 
defamation, one of many instances where the law of the plaintiff’s domicile is often outcome 
determinative. Id. 
 192. See In re Dorrance’s Estate, 163 A. 303 (Pa. 1932) (holding John Dorrance died domiciled in 
Pennsylvania); In re Dorrance’s Estate, 170 A. 601 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1934), aff’d mem., Dorrance v. 
Thayer Martin, 176 A. 902 (N.J. 1935) (holding John Dorrance died domiciled in New Jersey). These 
cases provide a lesson against gaming the concept of citizenship and domicile. 
 193. Mzamane, 693 F. Supp. 442. The Mzamane case depicts how classic domicile principles can 
negotiate the transnational realities of modern life. Id. 
 194. See generally SCOLES, supra note 166 (outlining historical debate). 
56
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss2/1
2015] CONFLICT OF LAWS STRUCTURE AND VISION 287 
doubt exists that the discipline has survived, developed, and served 
civilization for a long time. Its doctrines are sometimes technical and 
highly abstract. With the recent cascades of changes in technology, 
society, legal doctrine, theory, and law practice, a historically rooted, 
technical discipline may seem out of step with the challenges of 
modern life. Yet mechanisms for navigating differences among 
societies and legal systems are the essence of modern life. What 
Conflicts brings to these challenges is not only experience and age, 
but also a forthright recognition that law is imbued with cultural and 
political realities. Conflicts of Laws doctrines add discipline, 
structure, and respect to some of the most challenging legal issues of 
our time. With its wisdom and experience, Conflict of Laws is poised 
to provide guidance—and has the potential to lead the way in re-
conceptualizing (and resolving) contemporary power clashes. The 
feedback Conflict of Laws offers up may not always be clear; nor 
will it be necessarily perfect. But it will be disciplined, structured, 
and supported by time-tested reasoning. There’s not much more that 
one can expect from mere mortals’ law. 
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